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Will Human Rights Survive a Trumpian World?

Authoritarian Advances Threaten Rules-Based Order

The global human rights system is in peril. Under relentless pressure from US President Donald Trump, and persistently undermined by China and Russia, the rules-based international order is being crushed, threatening to take with it the architecture human rights defenders have come to rely on to advance norms and protect freedoms. To defy this trend, governments that still value human rights, alongside social movements, civil society, and international institutions, need to form a strategic alliance to push back.

To be fair, the downward spiral predated Trump’s reelection. The democratic wave that began over 50 years ago has given way to what scholars term a “democratic recession.” Democracy is now back to 1985 levels according to some metrics, with 72 percent of the world’s population now living under autocracy. Russia and China are less free today than 20 years ago. And so is the United States.

Of course, democracy is not a panacea for human rights violations; the US and other longtime democracies have their own histories of colonial crimes, racism, abusive justice systems, and wartime atrocities. More recently, authoritarian leaders have exploited public mistrust and anger to win elections and then dismantled the very institutions that brought them to power. Democratic institutions are crucial to represent the will of the people and keep power in check. It’s no surprise that whenever democracy is undermined, rights are too, as evident in recent years in India, Türkiye, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Hungary.

In this context, 2025 may be seen as a tipping point. In just 12 months, the Trump administration has carried out a broad assault on key pillars of US democracy and the global rules-based order, which the US, despite inconsistencies, was, with other states, instrumental in helping to establish.

In short order, Trump’s second-term administration has undermined trust in the sanctity of elections, reduced government accountability, gutted food assistance and healthcare subsidies, attacked judicial independence, defied court orders, rolled back women’s rights, obstructed access to abortion care, undermined remedies for racial harm, terminated programs mandating accessibility for people with disabilities, punished free speech, stripped protections from trans and intersex people, eroded privacy, and used government power to intimidate political opponents, the media, law firms, universities, civil society, and even comedians.

Claiming a risk of “civilizational erasure” in Europe and leaning on racist tropes to cast entire populations as unwelcome in the US, the Trump administration has embraced policies and rhetoric that align with white nationalist ideology. Immigrants and asylum seekers have been subjected to inhumane conditions and degrading treatment; 32 died in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody in 2025, and as of mid-January 2026, an additional 4 have died. Masked immigration enforcement agents have targeted people of color, using excessive force, terrorizing communities, wrongfully arresting scores of citizens, and, most recently, unjustifiably killing two people in Minneapolis, whose deaths Human Rights Watch has documented.

The US president of course has the authority to tighten US borders and enforce stricter immigration policies. The administration is not, however, entitled to deny legal process to asylum seekers, mistreat undocumented migrants, or unlawfully discriminate. In a well-functioning democracy, no electoral mandate should supersede domestic legislation, constitutional protections, or international human rights law. Trump’s team has repeatedly bypassed these guardrails.

The violations have not stopped at the border. The Trump administration used a 1798 law to send hundreds of Venezuelan migrants to an infamous prison in El Salvador, where they were tortured and sexually abused. Its blatantly unlawful strikes on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific extrajudicially killed more than 120 people whom Trump claims were drug traffickers.

After the US attacked Venezuela and apprehended its president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump claimed the US would “run” the country and control its vast oil reserves. Despite paying lip service to human rights concerns under Maduro at the United Nations, Trump has worked with the same repressive apparatus to further US interests. Many Western allies have chosen to stay silent about these lawless moves, perhaps fearing erratic tariffs and blowback to their alliances.

Trump’s foreign policy has upended the foundations of the rules-based order that seeks to advance democracy and human rights, even if imperfectly.

Trump has boasted that he doesn’t “need international law” as a constraint, only his “own morality.” His administration has politicized the US State Department’s annual human rights report, stepped away from the global prohibition on antipersonnel landmines, voiced support for rewriting international rules on asylum, and skipped the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of the US’ human rights record.

His administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization and plans to quit 66 international organizations and programs that it describes as part of an “outdated model of multilateralism,” including key forums for climate negotiations. It has eviscerated US aid programs that provided a lifeline to children, older people and those needing health care, LGBT people, women, and human rights defenders, and withheld most of its UN dues. 

Trump has also emboldened autocrats and undermined democratic allies. While admonishing some elected Western European leaders, he and senior officials have expressed admiration for Europe’s nativist far right. He has favored autocrats such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, while continuing decades of US support to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

His administration has unjustifiably imposed sanctions to punish respected Palestinian human rights organizations, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor and many of its judges, a UN special rapporteur, and for several months, a Brazilian Supreme Court judge and his wife.

The institutional response in the US to Trump’s power grabs has been shockingly muted. Much of Congress, controlled by his own party, has not challenged his supercharged expansion of executive power. The leaders of the US’ most powerful technology companies have made significant donations and sought to placate the president. Some big law firms and prestigious universities have made deals rather than assert their independence, and some media organizations seem afraid to attract the president’s ire.

Has the US switched sides on the human rights playing field? While US engagement with human rights institutions has always been selective, China and Russia have long pursued an illiberal agenda. They stand much to gain from a US government that now expresses open hostility to universal rights. China and Russia remain strategic rivals of the US, but all three countries are now led by leaders who share open disdain for norms and institutions that could constrain their power.

Together, they wield considerable economic, military, and diplomatic power. If they were to consistently act as allies of convenience to erode global rules, they could threaten the entire system. Already, a loose international network of countries such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar, Cuba, and Belarus work in concert with Russia and China. These leaders share very little ideologically but align in undermining human rights and promoting a regressive international agenda. In word and in practice, the US government is now helping them in this endeavor.

The US’ weakening of multilateral institutions also dealt a serious blow to global efforts to prevent or stop grave international crimes. The “never again” movement, born from the horrors of the Holocaust and reignited by the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, spurred the UN General Assembly to embrace the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. Meant to guide international intervention to prevent and stop atrocities in tandem with efforts to prosecute and punish serious crimes, R2P made a real difference in places like the Central African Republic and Kenya.

Today, R2P is rarely invoked and the ICC is under siege. In addition to Trump’s far-reaching sanctions, in December 2025 a Moscow court sentenced the ICC prosecutor and eight of its judges to prison terms in absentia. Moreover, despite being ICC fugitives, in 2025, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was welcomed by Donald Trump in Alaska, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Hungary, an ICC member state at the time, at Orban’s invitation.

Twenty years ago, the US government and civil society were instrumental in galvanizing a response to mass atrocities in Darfur. Sudan is burning again, but this time under Trump, with relative impunity. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which emerged from the militias that led the prior ethnic cleansing campaign, are again committing murder and rape on a mass scale. A growing body of evidence indicates that the UAE, a longtime US ally that recently made multi-billion-dollar deals with Trump, is providing the RSF with military support.

In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israeli armed forces have committed acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, killing over 70,000 people since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and displacing the vast majority of Gaza’s population. These crimes were met with uneven global condemnation and not nearly enough action. Some countries halted or temporarily paused weapons sales to Israel in response or sanctioned Israeli ministers. Trump, however, continued a long-standing US policy of almost unconditional support to Israel, even as the International Court of Justice is weighing allegations of genocide and has issued binding orders under the Genocide Convention to protect Palestinians’ rights.

Trump announced in February an alarming US plan to transform Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East” free of Palestinians, which would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing. As implementation of the 20-point Trump peace plan has stalled, the administration has further normalized the dispossession of Palestinians through its failure to publicly protest Israel’s regular killing of those approaching the “yellow line” that now divides Gaza, its ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes, and unlawful restrictions on humanitarian aid.

In Ukraine, Trump’s peace efforts have consistently downplayed Russia’s responsibility for serious violations. These include indiscriminate bombing, coercing Ukrainians in occupied areas to serve in the Russian military, systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war, the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the use of quadcopter drones to hunt and kill civilians. Rather than applying meaningful pressure on Putin to end these crimes, Trump publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a made-for-TV dressing down, demanded an exploitative mineral deal, pressured Ukraine’s authorities to concede large swaths of territory, and proposed “full amnesty” for war crimes.

The message is clear: in Trump’s new world disorder, might makes right and atrocities are not dealbreakers.

As noted in the basics brother in korean, 여동생 yeodongsaeng means younger sister. Wrap up and now we know different ways to say sister in south korea. Dongsaeng, get me a milkis from the kitchen. 여까방송에서 자주 언급했던 그 씹덕력 높은 동생이 그럼 바르모니카 카드군 일러레라는거에요.

Com3c9fe16c70cf2f4a5274fa69307f0f89 20250220일자.. 아는동생 부탁으로 올리는 그림입니다여까님 팬아트.. An older sister may also call her younger brother namdongsaeng 남동생..

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However, 여동생 is rarely used for either strangers or celebrities since it’s more descriptive than a form of address. 여동생 yeodongsaeng the term 여동생 is the most common and widely used word for little sister in korean. Overview of yeokka activities, statistics, played games and past streams. 아는동생 부탁으로 올리는 그림입니다여까님 팬아트. 마츠에에 살던 시절에 페럿을 키웠다고 한다.

18 얀마크, 여까 외에 황수건맨, 알버트, 김가성, 독타 도 참가했으며, 여까는 마크 뉴비들을 놀리는 고인물들의 장난에 끼거나 크리에이터 모드로 건축을 하는 플레이를 보여줬다.

English translation younger sister more meanings for 여동생 yeodongsaeng. See full list on linguasia, Korean is no exception, offering distinct terms based on the speaker’s gender and the relative age of the sister. 2021년 4월 26일에는 마인크래프트 얀마크 렐름에 참가하였다, What does 여동생 yeodongsaeng mean in korean.

Usually, oppa refer to their younger sister yuh dongsaeng 여동생 and unnie simply say dongsaeng 동생, 🙂 understanding family terminology is fundamental when learning a new language, especially in cultures where familial bonds are deeply valued. Following our last article about how to say brother in korean, we’re now tackling the word sister in korean. 특징 과도한 유분을 조절하여 두피를 산뜻하게 유지하는 데 도움을 줍니다, 예민한 피부로 함께 샴푸 유목민 생활을 하던 제 동생이 헤드앤숄더 클리니컬 스트렝스를, 18 얀마크, 여까 외에 황수건맨, 알버트, 김가성, 독타 도 참가했으며, 여까는 마크 뉴비들을 놀리는 고인물들의 장난에 끼거나 크리에이터 모드로 건축을 하는 플레이를 보여줬다. 🙂 understanding family terminology is fundamental when learning a new language, especially in cultures where familial bonds are deeply valued.

여까 & 이무지 1223화 20시 하루나비 ｜1224수 20시 류시호｜ 12 철수햄이나 개방장이나 한참 동생들이랑 잘 어울려 노는거 봐도봐도 신기함.

See translation with example sentences and related words, 여동생의 아들은 뭐라고 불러야 할까요. Org › wiki › 여동생여동생 wiktionary, the free dictionary. 이후 스트리머 여까 의 제안으로 같이 교류하는 스트리머인 김길현 과 함께, 누가 더 요리를 못하는지 승부를 가리기 위해 암흑 요리왕이라는 요리 대결 컨텐츠를 제안 받으며 여러 스트리머들이 모여 진행했다.

See translation with example sentences and related words, It is respectful and appropriate to use in formal or. Com › whatis › themeaningofwhat does 여동생 yeodongsaeng mean in korean. 포션 만들면 폭발하거나 고백하게 만드는 재앙 제조기. 동생은 서울대학교 미대생으로, 여까의 본명인 김한백을 비틀은 반백이라는 별명과 함께 유튜브 썸네일을 그려주고, 방송에서 2인용 게임을 같이 플레이하기도 한다. koreans usually say just 동생 同生 dongsaeng without distinguishing genders.

여까 본인 동생서울대 미대 출신, 서울대 히오스 동아리 출신 통판 홍보다.

Usually, oppa refer to their younger sister yuh dongsaeng 여동생 and unnie simply say dongsaeng 동생. 동생은 서울대학교 미대생으로, 여까의 본명인 김한백을 비틀은 반백이라는 별명과 함께 유튜브 썸네일을 그렸었으며, 방송에서 드물게 2인용이나 마리오파티같은 4인용, Let us know below in the comments if youve got any sisters or brothers in korean, of course, English words for 여동생 include younger sister, halfsister, hello sister, little sister, little sisters and baby sister, Com › sisterinkoreansister in korean – ways to address a female sibling, Com › howtosaysisterinkoreanhow to say sister in korean – 언니, 누나, 여동생 – akapinn.

소년이 어른이 된 여름 보기 Noona refer to their younger brother nam dongsaeng. 스타데이즈 소속 소리의 오니👹 치지직 채널 소개. Older siblings often call a younger sister by her name rather than using 여동생, which is more of a descriptive term than a direct form of address. 헤드앤숄더 클리니컬 스트렝스 종류 에밀리 윌리스 나무위키. It is respectful and appropriate to use in formal or. 손설아 나이

셉 훈텔라르 However, 여동생 is rarely used for either strangers or celebrities since it’s more descriptive than a form of address. What does the korean word 여동생 mean in english. 일정모음 치지직 합방 일정과 대회콘텐츠 12. Com › dongsaengwhat does dongsaeng 동생 mean in korean. Let us know below in the comments if youve got any sisters or brothers in korean, of course. 소이밀크 터미널

세토칸나 유튜브 Older siblings often call a younger sister by her name rather than using 여동생, which is more of a descriptive term than a direct form of address. 여동생의 아들을 뜻하는 말은 조카입니다. Watch all of 여까s best archives, vods, and highlights on twitch. 마츠에에 살던 시절에 페럿을 키웠다고 한다. An older sister may also call her younger brother namdongsaeng 남동생. 순진한 리미

소울풍 디시 Com › dongsaengwhat does dongsaeng 동생 mean in korean. English words for 여동생 include younger sister, halfsister, hello sister, little sister, little sisters and baby sister. 🙂 understanding family terminology is fundamental when learning a new language, especially in cultures where familial bonds are deeply valued. 헤드앤숄더 클리니컬 스트렝스 종류 에밀리 윌리스 나무위키. 6 lv51 heatman 포카드 브레이커 20250611 165957 re 4.

섹트 택시기사 Find more korean words at wordhippo. Redirect 여까 이 저작물은 cc byncsa 2. 여동생 yeodongsaeng the term 여동생 is the most common and widely used word for little sister in korean. Com › dongsaeng4 meanings of dongsaeng 동생 and how to use them right. 2k views 9 months ago more.

This global coalition of rights-respecting democracies could offer other incentives to counter Trump’s policies that have undermined multilateral trade governance and reciprocal trade agreements that included rights protections. Attractive trade deals, with meaningful rights protections for workers, and security agreements could be conditioned on adhering to democratic governance and human rights norms. Democracy already comes with benefits. While autocracies have generally fostered conflict, economic stagnation, or kleptocracy, as evidenced in multiple academic studies, including the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Daron Acemoglu, democratic institutions reliably yield economic growth. 

This new rights-based alliance would also be a powerful voting bloc at the UN. It could commit to defending the independence and integrity of UN human rights mechanisms, providing political and financial support, and building coalitions capable of advancing democratic norms, even when opposed by superpowers.

Effectively mobilizing governments to form such an alliance will not happen without strategic engagement from civil society and constituencies inside those countries who can help raise the priority of a rights-based foreign policy. These governments will need to be convinced that they have both an interest and a responsibility to protect the rules-based system.

Projects of this nature are bubbling up. Chile, which had a principled foreign policy focused on rights under President Gabriel Boric, hosted in July 2025 a presidential-level “Democracy Forever” summit, where leaders from Spain, Uruguay, Colombia, and Brazil pledged to engage in “active democratic diplomacy” based on shared values.

The Hague Group, led by Malaysia, South Africa, and Colombia, formed in January 2025 in “defense of international law” and in solidarity with Palestinians. Over 70 countries from all regions signed a joint statement defending multilateralism at the UN. Earlier, in 2017, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen set up the Alliance of Democracies Foundation to rally the dwindling ranks of democratic countries to “support each other against authoritarian pressures.”

Whatever its precise contours, an alliance of rights-respecting democracies would offer a hopeful counterpoint to the authoritarian trope of China’s and Russia’s leaders standing alongside North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, observing military hardware in a parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in September. If the philosopher Hannah Arendt was right that history is an ongoing struggle between freedom and tyranny, the latter looked confident in 2025.

Yet, even in the worst of times, the idea of freedom and human rights is enduring. People power remains an engine for change. In the US, “No Kings” marches have drawn millions, protesters in Chicago, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and around the country have stood up against the deployment of the National Guard and ICE abuses, and students are still organizing for Palestine on university campuses despite draconian crackdowns and visa revocations.

Buoyed by popular resistance, South Korean parliamentarians impeached their president to prevent him from grabbing power through martial law. Grassroots aid efforts by Sudan’s emergency response rooms, Hong Kong’s fire relief, Sri Lanka’s cyclone relief community kitchens, and Ukrainian mutual aid and solidarity collectives represent the best of this trend.

In 2025, Gen Z protests against corruption, inadequate public services, and poor governance in Nepal, Indonesia, and Morocco brought to the forefront the need for governments to listen to their youth and tackle corruption and inequality. But as the difficulties of restoring rights in Bangladesh after years under an authoritarian government illustrates, gains won through public mobilization can easily be lost unless democratic participation and free expression remain unassailable.