US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, June 4, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, June 4, 2026.
The global human rights system is in peril. Under relentless pressure from US President Donald Trump, and persistently undermined by China and Russia, the rules-based international order is being crushed, threatening to take with it the architecture human rights defenders have come to rely on to advance norms and protect freedoms. To defy this trend, governments that still value human rights, alongside social movements, civil society, and international institutions, need to form a strategic alliance to push back.
To be fair, the downward spiral predated Trump’s reelection. The democratic wave that began over 50 years ago has given way to what scholars term a “democratic recession.” Democracy is now back to 1985 levels according to some metrics, with 72 percent of the world’s population now living under autocracy. Russia and China are less free today than 20 years ago. And so is the United States.
Of course, democracy is not a panacea for human rights violations; the US and other longtime democracies have their own histories of colonial crimes, racism, abusive justice systems, and wartime atrocities. More recently, authoritarian leaders have exploited public mistrust and anger to win elections and then dismantled the very institutions that brought them to power. Democratic institutions are crucial to represent the will of the people and keep power in check. It’s no surprise that whenever democracy is undermined, rights are too, as evident in recent years in India, Türkiye, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Hungary.
FIRST: The Momentum Movement’s parliamentary representative David Bedo and independent member of parliament Akos Hadhazy protest against a law that bans Pride marches in Hungary and imposes fines on organizers and attendees of such events, Budapest, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Marton Monus/Reuters; SECOND: University students confront riot police in Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Ozan Köse/AFP via Getty Images
In this context, 2025 may be seen as a tipping point. In just 12 months, the Trump administration has carried out a broad assault on key pillars of US democracy and the global rules-based order, which the US, despite inconsistencies, was, with other states, instrumental in helping to establish.
In short order, Trump’s second-term administration has undermined trust in the sanctity of elections, reduced government accountability, gutted food assistance and healthcare subsidies, attacked judicial independence, defied court orders, rolled back women’s rights, obstructed access to abortion care, undermined remedies for racial harm, terminated programs mandating accessibility for people with disabilities, punished free speech, stripped protections from trans and intersex people, eroded privacy, and used government power to intimidate political opponents, the media, law firms, universities, civil society, and even comedians.
Claiming a risk of “civilizational erasure” in Europe and leaning on racist tropes to cast entire populations as unwelcome in the US, the Trump administration has embraced policies and rhetoric that align with white nationalist ideology. Immigrants and asylum seekers have been subjected to inhumane conditions and degrading treatment; 32 died in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody in 2025, and as of mid-January 2026, an additional 4 have died. Masked immigration enforcement agents have targeted people of color, using excessive force, terrorizing communities, wrongfully arresting scores of citizens, and, most recently, unjustifiably killing two people in Minneapolis, whose deaths Human Rights Watch has documented.
The US president of course has the authority to tighten US borders and enforce stricter immigration policies. The administration is not, however, entitled to deny legal process to asylum seekers, mistreat undocumented migrants, or unlawfully discriminate. In a well-functioning democracy, no electoral mandate should supersede domestic legislation, constitutional protections, or international human rights law. Trump’s team has repeatedly bypassed these guardrails.
The violations have not stopped at the border. The Trump administration used a 1798 law to send hundreds of Venezuelan migrants to an infamous prison in El Salvador, where they were tortured and sexually abused. Its blatantly unlawful strikes on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific extrajudicially killed more than 120 people whom Trump claims were drug traffickers.
US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, June 4, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, June 4, 2026.
After the US attacked Venezuela and apprehended its president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump claimed the US would “run” the country and control its vast oil reserves. Despite paying lip service to human rights concerns under Maduro at the United Nations, Trump has worked with the same repressive apparatus to further US interests. Many Western allies have chosen to stay silent about these lawless moves, perhaps fearing erratic tariffs and blowback to their alliances.
Trump’s foreign policy has upended the foundations of the rules-based order that seeks to advance democracy and human rights, even if imperfectly.
Trump has boasted that he doesn’t “need international law” as a constraint, only his “own morality.” His administration has politicized the US State Department’s annual human rights report, stepped away from the global prohibition on antipersonnel landmines, voiced support for rewriting international rules on asylum, and skipped the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of the US’ human rights record.
His administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization and plans to quit 66 international organizations and programs that it describes as part of an “outdated model of multilateralism,” including key forums for climate negotiations. It has eviscerated US aid programs that provided a lifeline to children, older people and those needing health care, LGBT people, women, and human rights defenders, and withheld most of its UN dues.
Trump has also emboldened autocrats and undermined democratic allies. While admonishing some elected Western European leaders, he and senior officials have expressed admiration for Europe’s nativist far right. He has favored autocrats such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, while continuing decades of US support to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
His administration has unjustifiably imposed sanctions to punish respected Palestinian human rights organizations, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor and many of its judges, a UN special rapporteur, and for several months, a Brazilian Supreme Court judge and his wife.
The institutional response in the US to Trump’s power grabs has been shockingly muted. Much of Congress, controlled by his own party, has not challenged his supercharged expansion of executive power. The leaders of the US’ most powerful technology companies have made significant donations and sought to placate the president. Some big law firms and prestigious universities have made deals rather than assert their independence, and some media organizations seem afraid to attract the president’s ire.
Has the US switched sides on the human rights playing field? While US engagement with human rights institutions has always been selective, China and Russia have long pursued an illiberal agenda. They stand much to gain from a US government that now expresses open hostility to universal rights. China and Russia remain strategic rivals of the US, but all three countries are now led by leaders who share open disdain for norms and institutions that could constrain their power.
Police detain an activist outside the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, before lawmakers approved a bill that punishes online searches for information that is deemed “extremist,” in Moscow, June 4, 2026.
Together, they wield considerable economic, military, and diplomatic power. If they were to consistently act as allies of convenience to erode global rules, they could threaten the entire system. Already, a loose international network of countries such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar, Cuba, and Belarus work in concert with Russia and China. These leaders share very little ideologically but align in undermining human rights and promoting a regressive international agenda. In word and in practice, the US government is now helping them in this endeavor.
FIRST: Surveillance cameras installed in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Kyodo News via Getty Images; SECOND: A television in a restaurant in Hong Kong shows a missile being launched during military exercises being held by China around the island of Taiwan, June 4, 2026. © 2022 Isaac Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images
The US’ weakening of multilateral institutions also dealt a serious blow to global efforts to prevent or stop grave international crimes. The “never again” movement, born from the horrors of the Holocaust and reignited by the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, spurred the UN General Assembly to embrace the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. Meant to guide international intervention to prevent and stop atrocities in tandem with efforts to prosecute and punish serious crimes, R2P made a real difference in places like the Central African Republic and Kenya.
Today, R2P is rarely invoked and the ICC is under siege. In addition to Trump’s far-reaching sanctions, in December 2025 a Moscow court sentenced the ICC prosecutor and eight of its judges to prison terms in absentia. Moreover, despite being ICC fugitives, in 2025, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was welcomed by Donald Trump in Alaska, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Hungary, an ICC member state at the time, at Orban’s invitation.
Twenty years ago, the US government and civil society were instrumental in galvanizing a response to mass atrocities in Darfur. Sudan is burning again, but this time under Trump, with relative impunity. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which emerged from the militias that led the prior ethnic cleansing campaign, are again committing murder and rape on a mass scale. A growing body of evidence indicates that the UAE, a longtime US ally that recently made multi-billion-dollar deals with Trump, is providing the RSF with military support.
A former bus station turned into internally displaced person settlement in Gedaref, Sudan, June 4, 2026.
In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israeli armed forces have committed acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, killing over 70,000 people since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and displacing the vast majority of Gaza’s population. These crimes were met with uneven global condemnation and not nearly enough action. Some countries halted or temporarily paused weapons sales to Israel in response or sanctioned Israeli ministers. Trump, however, continued a long-standing US policy of almost unconditional support to Israel, even as the International Court of Justice is weighing allegations of genocide and has issued binding orders under the Genocide Convention to protect Palestinians’ rights.
Trump announced in February an alarming US plan to transform Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East” free of Palestinians, which would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing. As implementation of the 20-point Trump peace plan has stalled, the administration has further normalized the dispossession of Palestinians through its failure to publicly protest Israel’s regular killing of those approaching the “yellow line” that now divides Gaza, its ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes, and unlawful restrictions on humanitarian aid.
FIRST: A Palestinian girl stands amidst rubble in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Bashar Taleb/AFP via Getty Images; SECOND: Palestinians inspect a house demolished by Israeli military forces in the town of Qabatiya in the Israeli occupied West Bank, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Nasser Ishtayeh/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
In Ukraine, Trump’s peace efforts have consistently downplayed Russia’s responsibility for serious violations. These include indiscriminate bombing, coercing Ukrainians in occupied areas to serve in the Russian military, systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war, the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the use of quadcopter drones to hunt and kill civilians. Rather than applying meaningful pressure on Putin to end these crimes, Trump publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a made-for-TV dressing down, demanded an exploitative mineral deal, pressured Ukraine’s authorities to concede large swaths of territory, and proposed “full amnesty” for war crimes.
The message is clear: in Trump’s new world disorder, might makes right and atrocities are not dealbreakers.
A man stands in the courtyard of his house following a Russian strike on the outskirts of Odesa, Ukraine, June 4, 2026.
다른 유럽인들의 인식에 의하면 슬라브는 초기부터 이미 정복당한 상태로 여겨진다. Com › shorthills › 50191346622슬라브인은 누구인가 1 근원 네이버 블로그. Org › wiki › 러시아의_역사러시아의 역사 위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전. 그러나 13세기 몽골의 침략과 이후의 리투아니아대공국의 지배를 받으면서, 우크라이나, 러시아.
이렇게 남자들의 눈에 맞춰, 사회적 기준에 맞춰 치장을 하다 보면 여성으로서의 정체성도 달라지게 됩니다. 과 유럽의 반 이상을 차지하는 방대한 지역을 차지하며 동슬라브족, 서슬. 620년대에 사모 samo 왕이 서부 슬라브족을 통합하여 왕국을 세웠는데, 658년 왕국이 붕괴한 이후 슬로베니아인의 조상은. 미모 세계 1위 우크라이나 러시아 여자들 슬라브족은 왜.개요 편집 1830년대에 처음 주장된 모든 슬라브족 들이 같다거나 모든 슬라브족들이 합쳐서 외세를 막자는 사상.. 게르만계 편집 근대 러시아 제국에서는 예카테리나 대제 의 지원에 힘입어 독일계 러시아인 인구가 러시아 제국 각 분야에서 맹활약했으나, 러시아 제국 내 반독감정을 거스를 수는 없었고, 19세기부터 독일인 들이 누리던 특혜가 슬슬 취소되기 시작했다..러시아 사람들이 그냥 보기만 하고 그 사람이 슬라브계. 슬라브인슬라브족 슬라브인славя́не 혹은 슬라브족славя́нские наро́ды은 슬라브어славя́нские языки́를 사용하는 유럽 최대의 민족 공동체를 말합니다. 모두 중세의 키예프 루스를 시초로 형성된 루스 지역의 주요 구성원을 기원으로 하며, 17세기부터 러시아인. 현재 그들은 남유럽, 중부유럽, 동유럽의 넓은 지역에 정착했을 뿐 아니라 러시아 극동 지역까지의 북아시아에 걸쳐. 우크라이나의 슬라브족은 9세기에 키예프 대공국을 세웠지만, 13세기 몽골 침략으로 무너졌다. 독일의 군사팽창을 겁내던 프랑스, 영국도 러시아와 3. 박기철의 낱말로 푸는 인문생태학 슬라브족과 소련사람. 같은 슬라브族이 東西 분단돼 800년 동안 러유럽 지배받아.
이러한 북부 러시아 툰드라 삼림 지대의 주요 민족들은 크게 나누어 볼 때 핀finns과 리투아니안lithuanians과 슬라브slavs로 분류되며 이들 세. 이 중에서 동슬라브족은 오늘날 러시아, 우크라이나, 벨라루스 민족의 조상이 됩니다. 슬라브 국가들 중 정교회 문화권인 러시아 의 존재감이 워낙 강하고 폴란드 나 체코, 슬로바키아 가 슬라브계 국가라는 사실이 잘 알려져 있지 않기 때문에, 한국에는 슬라브계 국가 사람들이 전부 정교회를 믿는다고 오해하는 사람들이 많다.
слав slav 슬라브족slavs 혹은 슬라브인slavic people은 슬라브어파 의 언어를 사용하.. Org › wiki › east_slavseast slavs wikipedia..
또한 슬라브족 거주 지역에는 다른 계통의 민족들이 일정하게 분포하고 있다. 내 질문은 이주와 인구 변화에 대한 것보다는, 왜 건국 당시의 스칸디나비아, 과 유럽의 반 이상을 차지하는 방대한 지역을 차지하며 동슬라브족, 서슬, 헝가리는 대초원 계통의 훈족이 성립한 나라로 국명도 훈족 hun에서 유래했고, 민족 차원에서는 한 뿌리인 훈족과 마자르족의 후예로 자처한다. 단지 동슬라브족만은 9세기 키예프공국을 세워 외적의 침입에도 불구하고 국토를 유지하면서 중앙집권적인 러시아 제국을 건설하였다.
러시아 문화 이야기 러시아 고대 시대의 여명 슬라브족의, 동유럽 신화라고도 하는데 말 그대로 동유럽 에 사는 러시아, 우크라이나, 슬라브족은 고유의 언어와 문화를 발전시켰으며, 그들의 영향력은 중부, 동부, 남부 유럽 전역에 걸쳐 있습니다. 러시아 문화 이야기 러시아 고대 시대의 여명 슬라브족의.
1819세기 슬라브 제민족의 민족 해방운동이 일어났고, 특히 남슬라브족은 오스만투르크제국의 쇠퇴를 계기로 독립하였다. 오스트리아는 같은 게르만족인 독일과 한편이었다. 슬라브인은 누구인가1 근원 네이버 블로그. ‘славянофилы’ slavophiles, 슬라브주의자는 러시아의 독특함과 유일무이함을 강조했다, 슬라브계 인종끼리의 이른바 제노사이드가 자주 발생하는, 슬라브족의 기원과 역사 슬라브족은 고대에 동유럽과 중앙유럽 지역에 기원을 두고 있는 민족적 집단입니다.
Com › shorthills › 50191346622슬라브인은 누구인가 1 근원 네이버 블로그, 3 they speak the east slavic languages, 4 and formed the majority of the population of the medieval state kievan rus, which they consider their cultural ancestor. 살로 salo는 러시아및 동유럽, 발칸반도쪽에서 많이 먹습니다 아무래도 동유럽은 춥다보니, 높은 열량을 위해서 기름기있는 식단을 좋아합니다, 아바르국은 필요한 곡물을 조달하기 위해 슬라브 종족을 농업에 종사시켰고, 그들을 외적의 침입에 대항한 첨병 尖兵으로 여기저기 국경, 앞서 포스트에서 서술한 바 있는데 여성들은 남자들을 의식하고 치장을 합니다.
노바토포스 회원, 역사학자, 고고인류학자, 칼럼니스트, 러시아 과학아카데미 유라시아 고고인류학연구소 연구교수, 체코와 슬로바키아, 폴란드가 속한 서 슬라브족 west slavs, 러시아, 우크라이나, 벨라루스가 속한 동 슬라브족 east slavs, 불가리아, 마케도니아, 유고슬라비아, 세르비아, 보스니아, 몬테네그로, 크로티아, 슬로베니아가 속한 남 슬라브족 south slavs 이 그, 금발에 바다같은 푸른 눈, 오똑한 코, 큰 키. 14 while these processes began long before the fall of kiev, its fall expedited these gradual developments into a significant, 분포 슬라브족들은 원래 훨씬 동부에 존재하였다, 모스크바는 기본이 영하 1020도이며, 다른 러시아 지방들도 영하 2035도 정도 나갑니다 그래서 돼지 지방에 소금을 넣고, 숙성시킨 살로 salo라는.
좀비고 야설 개요 편집 한국에서는 러시아 가 다민족국가 라기보다는 슬라브계 민족국가라는 인식이 강한 편인데, 기본적으로 러시아는 땅이 넓고, 다양한 소수민족들이 존재하는 다민족국가이다. 이들은 동쪽으로는 드니프로강 에 정착했다. 주로 동유럽에 거주하는 동슬라브족, 중앙유럽에 거주하는 서슬라브족, 남유럽에 거주하는 남슬라브족으로 구분된다. 동슬라브족은 키예프 루스8821240라는 같은 뿌리에서 출발하였다. 노바토포스 회원, 역사학자, 고고인류학자, 칼럼니스트, 러시아 과학아카데미 유라시아 고고인류학연구소 연구교수. 젠이츠 네즈코 키스
조겸 단지 동슬라브족만은 9세기 키예프공국을 세워 외적의 침입에도 불구하고 국토를 유지하면서 중앙집권적인 러시아 제국을 건설하였다. 체코와 슬로바키아, 폴란드가 속한 서 슬라브족 west slavs, 러시아, 우크라이나, 벨라루스가 속한 동 슬라브족 east slavs, 불가리아, 마케도니아, 유고슬라비아, 세르비아, 보스니아, 몬테네그로, 크로티아, 슬로베니아가 속한 남 슬라브족 south slavs 이 그. 슬라브족 위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전. 2000년부터 2006년에 러시아 연방 학자들이 연구한 러시아인 무리의 기원에 대한 연구 결과를 보면 러시아인들은 유전적으로 슬라브족이 아니고, 휜란드. 슬라브에 대한 문서, славяне slav슬라브족 slavs 혹은 슬라브인 slavic people은 슬라브어파의 언어를 사용하는 유럽의 종족 집단이다. 정자동 왁싱샵 사장님 인스 타
젖 트위터 하지만 슬라브계 종족들이 대규모로 동유럽 과 발칸반도 로 확산되는 것은 튀르크 아바르 칸국 시대였다. 그만큼 우크라이나에 미녀가 많다는 얘기다. 이 중에서 동슬라브족은 오늘날 러시아, 우크라이나, 벨라루스 민족의 조상이 됩니다. 인도유럽어족 중에 게르만어파 언어 를 사용하는 민족을 총칭하고, 우리가. Com › 1087460슬라브족과 러시아, 그리고 벨라루스. 전 남친 작품 디시
좀 짜네 다시 만들어줄게 노바토포스 회원, 역사학자, 고고인류학자, 칼럼니스트, 러시아 과학아카데미 유라시아 고고인류학연구소 연구교수. 러시아 제국의 영토는 확장됐으며, 다른 나라와의 외교, 정치, 경제, 모든. 개요 편집 1830년대에 처음 주장된 모든 슬라브족 들이 같다거나 모든 슬라브족들이 합쳐서 외세를 막자는 사상. 체코와 슬로바키아, 폴란드가 속한 서 슬라브족 west slavs, 러시아, 우크라이나, 벨라루스가 속한 동 슬라브족 east slavs, 불가리아, 마케도니아, 유고슬라비아, 세르비아, 보스니아, 몬테네그로, 크로티아, 슬로베니아가 속한 남 슬라브족 south slavs 이 그. 우크라이나 동유럽에 위치하며, 역사적으로 러시아와 많은 문화적 연관이 있습니다 3.
정조역전 태그 4 아틸라와 같은 유목민의 정복, 약탈을 당하던 게르만족이 서유럽으로 떠나자 동방에서 슬라브족이 유목민들의 공격을 피하여 러시아 지역으로 이주해왔다. 이 당시 이동한 슬라브인들이 현재 러시아, 우크라이나, 벨라루스에 속한 동 슬라브족east slavs antic의 조상입니다. 피와 눈물과 이야기의 땅, 슬라브 나라들을 아시나요. 이들은 키예프 루스 kievan rus와 같은 중요한 국가를 형성하며, 러시아 제국의 기초를 다졌습니다. слав slav 슬라브족slavs 혹은 슬라브인slavic people은 슬라브어파 의 언어를 사용하.
Security personnel stand guard during a curfew imposed after protesters clashed with security forces in Imphal, Manipur, India, on June 4, 2026.
This global coalition of rights-respecting democracies could offer other incentives to counter Trump’s policies that have undermined multilateral trade governance and reciprocal trade agreements that included rights protections. Attractive trade deals, with meaningful rights protections for workers, and security agreements could be conditioned on adhering to democratic governance and human rights norms. Democracy already comes with benefits. While autocracies have generally fostered conflict, economic stagnation, or kleptocracy, as evidenced in multiple academic studies, including the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Daron Acemoglu, democratic institutions reliably yield economic growth.
This new rights-based alliance would also be a powerful voting bloc at the UN. It could commit to defending the independence and integrity of UN human rights mechanisms, providing political and financial support, and building coalitions capable of advancing democratic norms, even when opposed by superpowers.
Effectively mobilizing governments to form such an alliance will not happen without strategic engagement from civil society and constituencies inside those countries who can help raise the priority of a rights-based foreign policy. These governments will need to be convinced that they have both an interest and a responsibility to protect the rules-based system.
Projects of this nature are bubbling up. Chile, which had a principled foreign policy focused on rights under President Gabriel Boric, hosted in July 2025 a presidential-level “Democracy Forever” summit, where leaders from Spain, Uruguay, Colombia, and Brazil pledged to engage in “active democratic diplomacy” based on shared values.
The Hague Group, led by Malaysia, South Africa, and Colombia, formed in January 2025 in “defense of international law” and in solidarity with Palestinians. Over 70 countries from all regions signed a joint statement defending multilateralism at the UN. Earlier, in 2017, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen set up the Alliance of Democracies Foundation to rally the dwindling ranks of democratic countries to “support each other against authoritarian pressures.”
Whatever its precise contours, an alliance of rights-respecting democracies would offer a hopeful counterpoint to the authoritarian trope of China’s and Russia’s leaders standing alongside North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, observing military hardware in a parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in September. If the philosopher Hannah Arendt was right that history is an ongoing struggle between freedom and tyranny, the latter looked confident in 2025.
Yet, even in the worst of times, the idea of freedom and human rights is enduring. People power remains an engine for change. In the US, “No Kings” marches have drawn millions, protesters in Chicago, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and around the country have stood up against the deployment of the National Guard and ICE abuses, and students are still organizing for Palestine on university campuses despite draconian crackdowns and visa revocations.
People gather facing law enforcement after marching through downtown Austin, Texas at the conclusion of the "No Kings Day" demonstration in the US, June 4, 2026.
Buoyed by popular resistance, South Korean parliamentarians impeached their president to prevent him from grabbing power through martial law. Grassroots aid efforts by Sudan’s emergency response rooms, Hong Kong’s fire relief, Sri Lanka’s cyclone relief community kitchens, and Ukrainian mutual aid and solidarity collectives represent the best of this trend.
In 2025, Gen Z protests against corruption, inadequate public services, and poor governance in Nepal, Indonesia, and Morocco brought to the forefront the need for governments to listen to their youth and tackle corruption and inequality. But as the difficulties of restoring rights in Bangladesh after years under an authoritarian government illustrates, gains won through public mobilization can easily be lost unless democratic participation and free expression remain unassailable.
People take part in a youth-led protest against corruption and calling for education and healthcare reforms, in Rabat, Morocco, June 4, 2026.
Demonstrators outside Nepal's Parliament during a protest in Kathmandu condemning social media prohibitions and corruption by the government, June 4, 2026.
In this more hostile world, civil society is more critical than ever. It’s also increasingly endangered, particularly in an environment where funding is scarce. In 2025, Human Rights Watch was labeled “undesirable” and banned from operating in Russia. For partners in Egypt, Hong Kong, and India, these tactics are all too familiar. Restrictions on civil society and protest have become more commonplace in Europe, including the UK and France. And now, for the first time, many worry about risks associated with their operational presence in the US, where the Open Society Foundations, a major donor, have already been threatened, and the administration is preparing a list of “domestic terrorists” under overbroad guidance that could be interpreted to include the work of many progressive groups.
Breaking the authoritarian wave and standing up for human rights is a generational challenge. In 2026, it will play out most acutely in the US, with far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world. Fighting back will require a determined, strategic, and coordinated reaction from voters, civil society, multilateral institutions, and rights-respecting governments around the globe.
Com › 1087460슬라브족과 러시아, 그리고 벨라루스., Human Rights Watch’s 36th annual review of human rights practices and trends around the globe, reviews developments in more than 100 countries.