He was an associate professor at hokkaido university, then at the university of tokyo, and assumed the current position in 2015.

Will Human Rights Survive a Trumpian World?

Authoritarian Advances Threaten Rules-Based Order

The global human rights system is in peril. Under relentless pressure from US President Donald Trump, and persistently undermined by China and Russia, the rules-based international order is being crushed, threatening to take with it the architecture human rights defenders have come to rely on to advance norms and protect freedoms. To defy this trend, governments that still value human rights, alongside social movements, civil society, and international institutions, need to form a strategic alliance to push back.

To be fair, the downward spiral predated Trump’s reelection. The democratic wave that began over 50 years ago has given way to what scholars term a “democratic recession.” Democracy is now back to 1985 levels according to some metrics, with 72 percent of the world’s population now living under autocracy. Russia and China are less free today than 20 years ago. And so is the United States.

Of course, democracy is not a panacea for human rights violations; the US and other longtime democracies have their own histories of colonial crimes, racism, abusive justice systems, and wartime atrocities. More recently, authoritarian leaders have exploited public mistrust and anger to win elections and then dismantled the very institutions that brought them to power. Democratic institutions are crucial to represent the will of the people and keep power in check. It’s no surprise that whenever democracy is undermined, rights are too, as evident in recent years in India, Türkiye, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Hungary.

In this context, 2025 may be seen as a tipping point. In just 12 months, the Trump administration has carried out a broad assault on key pillars of US democracy and the global rules-based order, which the US, despite inconsistencies, was, with other states, instrumental in helping to establish.

In short order, Trump’s second-term administration has undermined trust in the sanctity of elections, reduced government accountability, gutted food assistance and healthcare subsidies, attacked judicial independence, defied court orders, rolled back women’s rights, obstructed access to abortion care, undermined remedies for racial harm, terminated programs mandating accessibility for people with disabilities, punished free speech, stripped protections from trans and intersex people, eroded privacy, and used government power to intimidate political opponents, the media, law firms, universities, civil society, and even comedians.

Claiming a risk of “civilizational erasure” in Europe and leaning on racist tropes to cast entire populations as unwelcome in the US, the Trump administration has embraced policies and rhetoric that align with white nationalist ideology. Immigrants and asylum seekers have been subjected to inhumane conditions and degrading treatment; 32 died in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody in 2025, and as of mid-January 2026, an additional 4 have died. Masked immigration enforcement agents have targeted people of color, using excessive force, terrorizing communities, wrongfully arresting scores of citizens, and, most recently, unjustifiably killing two people in Minneapolis, whose deaths Human Rights Watch has documented.

The US president of course has the authority to tighten US borders and enforce stricter immigration policies. The administration is not, however, entitled to deny legal process to asylum seekers, mistreat undocumented migrants, or unlawfully discriminate. In a well-functioning democracy, no electoral mandate should supersede domestic legislation, constitutional protections, or international human rights law. Trump’s team has repeatedly bypassed these guardrails.

The violations have not stopped at the border. The Trump administration used a 1798 law to send hundreds of Venezuelan migrants to an infamous prison in El Salvador, where they were tortured and sexually abused. Its blatantly unlawful strikes on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific extrajudicially killed more than 120 people whom Trump claims were drug traffickers.

After the US attacked Venezuela and apprehended its president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump claimed the US would “run” the country and control its vast oil reserves. Despite paying lip service to human rights concerns under Maduro at the United Nations, Trump has worked with the same repressive apparatus to further US interests. Many Western allies have chosen to stay silent about these lawless moves, perhaps fearing erratic tariffs and blowback to their alliances.

Trump’s foreign policy has upended the foundations of the rules-based order that seeks to advance democracy and human rights, even if imperfectly.

Trump has boasted that he doesn’t “need international law” as a constraint, only his “own morality.” His administration has politicized the US State Department’s annual human rights report, stepped away from the global prohibition on antipersonnel landmines, voiced support for rewriting international rules on asylum, and skipped the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of the US’ human rights record.

His administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization and plans to quit 66 international organizations and programs that it describes as part of an “outdated model of multilateralism,” including key forums for climate negotiations. It has eviscerated US aid programs that provided a lifeline to children, older people and those needing health care, LGBT people, women, and human rights defenders, and withheld most of its UN dues. 

Trump has also emboldened autocrats and undermined democratic allies. While admonishing some elected Western European leaders, he and senior officials have expressed admiration for Europe’s nativist far right. He has favored autocrats such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, while continuing decades of US support to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

His administration has unjustifiably imposed sanctions to punish respected Palestinian human rights organizations, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor and many of its judges, a UN special rapporteur, and for several months, a Brazilian Supreme Court judge and his wife.

The institutional response in the US to Trump’s power grabs has been shockingly muted. Much of Congress, controlled by his own party, has not challenged his supercharged expansion of executive power. The leaders of the US’ most powerful technology companies have made significant donations and sought to placate the president. Some big law firms and prestigious universities have made deals rather than assert their independence, and some media organizations seem afraid to attract the president’s ire.

Has the US switched sides on the human rights playing field? While US engagement with human rights institutions has always been selective, China and Russia have long pursued an illiberal agenda. They stand much to gain from a US government that now expresses open hostility to universal rights. China and Russia remain strategic rivals of the US, but all three countries are now led by leaders who share open disdain for norms and institutions that could constrain their power.

Together, they wield considerable economic, military, and diplomatic power. If they were to consistently act as allies of convenience to erode global rules, they could threaten the entire system. Already, a loose international network of countries such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar, Cuba, and Belarus work in concert with Russia and China. These leaders share very little ideologically but align in undermining human rights and promoting a regressive international agenda. In word and in practice, the US government is now helping them in this endeavor.

The US’ weakening of multilateral institutions also dealt a serious blow to global efforts to prevent or stop grave international crimes. The “never again” movement, born from the horrors of the Holocaust and reignited by the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, spurred the UN General Assembly to embrace the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. Meant to guide international intervention to prevent and stop atrocities in tandem with efforts to prosecute and punish serious crimes, R2P made a real difference in places like the Central African Republic and Kenya.

Today, R2P is rarely invoked and the ICC is under siege. In addition to Trump’s far-reaching sanctions, in December 2025 a Moscow court sentenced the ICC prosecutor and eight of its judges to prison terms in absentia. Moreover, despite being ICC fugitives, in 2025, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was welcomed by Donald Trump in Alaska, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Hungary, an ICC member state at the time, at Orban’s invitation.

Twenty years ago, the US government and civil society were instrumental in galvanizing a response to mass atrocities in Darfur. Sudan is burning again, but this time under Trump, with relative impunity. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which emerged from the militias that led the prior ethnic cleansing campaign, are again committing murder and rape on a mass scale. A growing body of evidence indicates that the UAE, a longtime US ally that recently made multi-billion-dollar deals with Trump, is providing the RSF with military support.

In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israeli armed forces have committed acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, killing over 70,000 people since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and displacing the vast majority of Gaza’s population. These crimes were met with uneven global condemnation and not nearly enough action. Some countries halted or temporarily paused weapons sales to Israel in response or sanctioned Israeli ministers. Trump, however, continued a long-standing US policy of almost unconditional support to Israel, even as the International Court of Justice is weighing allegations of genocide and has issued binding orders under the Genocide Convention to protect Palestinians’ rights.

Trump announced in February an alarming US plan to transform Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East” free of Palestinians, which would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing. As implementation of the 20-point Trump peace plan has stalled, the administration has further normalized the dispossession of Palestinians through its failure to publicly protest Israel’s regular killing of those approaching the “yellow line” that now divides Gaza, its ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes, and unlawful restrictions on humanitarian aid.

In Ukraine, Trump’s peace efforts have consistently downplayed Russia’s responsibility for serious violations. These include indiscriminate bombing, coercing Ukrainians in occupied areas to serve in the Russian military, systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war, the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the use of quadcopter drones to hunt and kill civilians. Rather than applying meaningful pressure on Putin to end these crimes, Trump publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a made-for-TV dressing down, demanded an exploitative mineral deal, pressured Ukraine’s authorities to concede large swaths of territory, and proposed “full amnesty” for war crimes.

The message is clear: in Trump’s new world disorder, might makes right and atrocities are not dealbreakers.

アジア政治外交史、中国政治・外交を専門とする川島真・東京大学大学院教授が登壇。中国共産党大会後の中国政治、外交について話した。 司会. 1968年生まれ 1997年 東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科アジア文化研究専攻（東洋史学）博士課程単位取得退学、博士（. 所属 現在：東京大学,大学院総合文化研究科,教授公益財団法人東洋文庫,研究部,研究員, 研究分野：国際関係論,政治学,東洋史,史学一般,小区分06020国際関係論関連. Shin kawashima, professor, the graduate school of arts & sciences, the university of tokyo東京大学大学院の川島真教授が、中国を中心に日本の戦後外交について話し.

Com › topics › evp01142川島真投稿一覧.. Com川島真研究室 – 東京大学総合文化研究科.. 博士（文学）。北海道大学法学部助教授などを経て、2015年から東京大学大学院総合文化研究科国際社会科学専攻・教授。現在、内閣府国家安全保障局シニアフェロー、経団連21 read more.. 1面参照 □東大院教授（アジア政治外交史）・川島真氏 中国は日本への対抗措置のレベルを一つずつ上げている。2012年に尖閣諸島をめぐって日中関係が悪化..

ゲスト Guest 川島真 Shin Kawashima 東京大学大学院教授 Professor Of Graduate School Of Arts And Sciences,tokyo University 研究テーマ 中国で何が起きているのか 研究会回数 13.

Com › contributors › shinkawashima川島 真 中国学. 研究者「川島 真」の詳細情報です。jglobal 科学技術総合リンクセンターは、国立研究開発法人科学技術振興機構（jst）が運営する、無料で研究者、文献、特許などの科学技術・医学薬学等の二次情報を閲覧できる検索サービスです。検索結果からjst内外の良質な一次情報等へ案内します。. 川島真 shin kawashima 東京大学大学院総合文化研究科・教授 東京大学大学院総合文化研究科教授 東アジア近代史 中国政治外交史 1998年に北海道大学法学部助教授に就任、2006年まで同大学にて勤務。. 川島真の歴史と現在 川島 真：東京大学大学院総合文化研究科 教授 略歴 1968年生まれ 1997年 東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科アジア文化研究専攻（東洋史学）博士課程単位取得退学、博士（文学） 1998年 北海道大学法学部政治学講座助教授. , 1992, and received his degrees from the university of tokyo m, 台湾平和解決、発信を 川島真・東大教授（アジア政治外交史）.

大田俊寛「オウム真理教を支配した『精神呪縛』の構造」（中央公論4月号） 川島真・森聡「米中競争の新局面、強まる貿易圧力」（voice4月号. 川島真の歴史と現在 川島 真：東京大学大学院総合文化研究科 教授 略歴 1968年生まれ 1997年 東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科アジア文化研究専攻（東洋史学）博士課程単位取得退学、博士（文学） 1998年 北海道大学法学部政治学講座助教授. 川島真の歴史と現在 川島 真：東京大学大学院総合文化研究科 教授 略歴 1968年生まれ 1997年 東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科アジア文化研究専攻（東洋史学）博士課程単位取得退学、博士（文学） 1998年 北海道大学法学部政治学講座助教授. 戦後初期における国共両党の政治宣伝の展開 学歴. 国分, 良成, 添谷, 芳秀, 高原, 明生, 川島, 真, krulak, keith routledge,jpic 2017年 isbn 915 21世紀の「中華」 習近平中国と東アジア 川島, 真 中央公論新社 2016年11月 isbn 064 東アジアのかたち 秩序形成と統合をめぐる日米中aseanの交差.

Tv ）で公開中の一部のコンテンツをこちらのyoutubeチャンネルでもご覧いただけます。南シナ海.

Jp › articles › 20260130台湾平和解決、発信を 川島真・東大教授（アジア政治外交史）, 川島 真 （かわしま しん、 1968年 4月20日 ）は、 日本 の 歴史学者 ・ 政治学者。専門は、アジア政治外交史。 博士（文学） （東京大学 ・ 課程博士 ・2000年）。 東京大学大学院総合文化研究科 教授。アジア政経学会理事長、元 日本現代中国学会 理事長。東アジア近代史学会副会長. He was an associate professor at hokkaido university, then at the university of tokyo, and assumed the current position in 2015, 結果 データ分析失敗事例集 失敗から学び、成功を手にする データ分析失敗事例集 失敗から学び、成功を手にする よくわかる現代中国政治 やわらかアカデミズム・.

『中国近代外交の形成』（名古屋大学出版会、2004年）：サントリー学芸賞受賞 『近代国家への模索 1894－1925』（岩波書店、2010年） 『チャイナ・リスク』（編著、岩波書店、2015年） 『21世紀の「中華」――習近平中国と東アジア』（中央公論新社、2016年） 『中国のフロンティア――揺れ動く.. 川島 真 （かわしま しん、 1968年 4月20日 ）は、 日本 の 歴史学者 ・ 政治学者。 専門は、アジア政治外交史。 博士（文学） （東京大学 ・ 課程博士 ・2000年）。 東京大学大学院総合文化研究科 教授。 アジア政経学会理事長、元 日本現代中国学会 理事長。.. 研究課題 地域研究的方法による東アジア国際関係論の再構築 中国の統治におけるソ連・ロシア要因ー中国共産党から見たソ連の終末とロシアの統治 1921世紀中国の国際..

Jp › Read0055164川島 真 Shin Kawashima マイポータル Researchmap.

川島真 岡本隆司・川島真編『中国近代外交の胎動』 181202 2009年 査読有り 領域と記憶―租界・租借地・勢力範囲をめぐる言説と制度 川島真 貴志俊彦・谷垣真理子・深町英夫編『模索する近代日中関係―対話と共存の時代―』 159183 2009年 査読有り, 川島真・小嶋華津子編著『よくわかる 現代中国政治』やわらかアカデミズム、ミネルヴァ書房、2020年. 「日本の対中政策は、何が理念なのか分からない。米国と同じなのか。明確な戦略が見えない」 アジア政治外交史、中国政治・外交を専門とする川島真・東京大学大学院教授は冒頭、こう切り出した。 米国. 川島 真 shin kawashimaの記事一覧 abjマークは、この電子書店・電子書籍配信サービスが、著作権者からコンテンツ使用許諾を得た正規版配信サービスであることを示す登録商標 登録番号 第6091713号 です。 abjマークについて、詳しくはこちらを御覧ください。 saebs.

twstalker kbj 川島 真 は、日本の歴史学者・政治学者。専門は、アジア政治外交史。博士（文学）（東京大学・課程博士・2000年）。東京大学大学院総合文化研究科教授。元日本現代中国学会理事長。東アジア近代史学会副会長、アジア政経学会副理事長。サントリー学芸賞受賞（2004年）、外務大臣表彰（2023. Title link 1 共編著 川島真・松永正義・陳翠蓮編著『跨域青年学者 台湾史研究 第四集』（国立政治大学台湾史研究所、2011年、577頁） 2 学術協力 東京国立博物館・毎日新聞社編『特別展 孫文と梅屋庄吉―100年前の中国と日本』（東京国立. Tv ）で公開中の一部のコンテンツをこちらのyoutubeチャンネルでもご覧いただけます。南シナ海. Jp › articles › 20260130台湾平和解決、発信を 川島真・東大教授（アジア政治外交史）. 1968年生まれ 1997年 東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科アジア文化研究専攻（東洋史学）博士課程単位取得退学、博士（. twitter asia caning 체벌

v3jogemov Hours ago 台湾有事に関する高市早苗首相の発言は、約10年前の安保法制に関する議論に照らしても、特段逸脱したものではない。中国側が反発しているの. Shin kawashima, professor, the graduate school of arts & sciences, the university of tokyo東京大学大学院の川島真教授が、中国を中心に日本の戦後外交について話し. 川島真（かわしま・しん）氏 1968年生まれ。東京大大学院准教授などを経て2015年から現職。外交専門誌「外交」編集委員。著書に「21世紀の『中華』─習近平. 川島 真 kawashima shin 東京大学教授 1992年東京外国語大学外国語学部中国語学科卒業。 1994年東京大学大学院人文科学研究科東洋史学科修士課程修了、1997年東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科アジア文化研究専攻博士課程単位取得退学。 2000年博士学位（文学. Comenglish cv – 川島真研究室. www.pornhub.clm

twitter 19tool 続投がささやかれる習近平政権の国内統治と世界戦略を読み解く。 おもな目次 総論 コロナ禍で立ち現れた中国を見る川島 真 第i部 習近平政権の国内統治 第1章 コロナ禍で現れた習近平政権の「社区」統治小嶋華津子. He was awarded the japan scholarship of the wilson center in 2009, among other positions at outside institutions. 川島真（かわしま しん） 研究主幹紹介 経団連総合政策研究所. 大田俊寛「オウム真理教を支配した『精神呪縛』の構造」（中央公論4月号） 川島真・森聡「米中競争の新局面、強まる貿易圧力」（voice4月号. 台湾平和解決、発信を 川島真・東大教授（アジア政治外交史）. winter erome

wall.st_william instagram 首頁home 教員biography 学歴2001年3月 博士学位（文学）取得（『中華民国前期外交史研究』） 1997年3月 東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科アジア文化研究専攻博士課程 read more. 所属 現在：東京大学,大学院総合文化研究科,教授公益財団法人東洋文庫,研究部,研究員, 研究分野：国際関係論,政治学,東洋史,史学一般,小区分06020国際関係論関連, キーワード：東アジア,冷戦,メディア,日中関係,中国,経済統合,日中関係史,国際研究者交流,日中戦争,安全保障, 研究課題数：51. , 1992, and received his degrees from the university of tokyo m. 「日本の対中政策は、何が理念なのか分からない。米国と同じなのか。明確な戦略が見えない」 アジア政治外交史、中国政治・外交を専門とする川島真・東京大学大学院教授は冒頭、こう切り出した。 米国. 1968年生まれ 1997年 東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科アジア文化研究専攻（東洋史学）博士課程単位取得退学、博士（.

usebitter0312 디시 Com › contributors › shinkawashima川島 真 中国学. アメリカの秩序への挑戦 中国外交にとって、2019年は米中対立という四文字が最も重要な課題であったかもしれない。だが、むしろ重要なのは. 川島 真（かわしま しん、1968年4月20日 ）は、日本の歴史学者・政治学者。 専門は、アジア政治外交史。 博士（文学）（東京大学・課程博士・2000年）。 東京大学大学院総合文化研究科教授。. 所属 現在：東京大学,大学院総合文化研究科,教授公益財団法人東洋文庫,研究部,研究員, 研究分野：国際関係論,政治学,東洋史,史学一般,小区分06020国際関係論関連. Jp › experts › kawashima_shin川島 真（かわしま しん） 研究者紹介 公益財団法人 中曽根康弘世.

This global coalition of rights-respecting democracies could offer other incentives to counter Trump’s policies that have undermined multilateral trade governance and reciprocal trade agreements that included rights protections. Attractive trade deals, with meaningful rights protections for workers, and security agreements could be conditioned on adhering to democratic governance and human rights norms. Democracy already comes with benefits. While autocracies have generally fostered conflict, economic stagnation, or kleptocracy, as evidenced in multiple academic studies, including the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Daron Acemoglu, democratic institutions reliably yield economic growth. 

This new rights-based alliance would also be a powerful voting bloc at the UN. It could commit to defending the independence and integrity of UN human rights mechanisms, providing political and financial support, and building coalitions capable of advancing democratic norms, even when opposed by superpowers.

Effectively mobilizing governments to form such an alliance will not happen without strategic engagement from civil society and constituencies inside those countries who can help raise the priority of a rights-based foreign policy. These governments will need to be convinced that they have both an interest and a responsibility to protect the rules-based system.

Projects of this nature are bubbling up. Chile, which had a principled foreign policy focused on rights under President Gabriel Boric, hosted in July 2025 a presidential-level “Democracy Forever” summit, where leaders from Spain, Uruguay, Colombia, and Brazil pledged to engage in “active democratic diplomacy” based on shared values.

The Hague Group, led by Malaysia, South Africa, and Colombia, formed in January 2025 in “defense of international law” and in solidarity with Palestinians. Over 70 countries from all regions signed a joint statement defending multilateralism at the UN. Earlier, in 2017, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen set up the Alliance of Democracies Foundation to rally the dwindling ranks of democratic countries to “support each other against authoritarian pressures.”

Whatever its precise contours, an alliance of rights-respecting democracies would offer a hopeful counterpoint to the authoritarian trope of China’s and Russia’s leaders standing alongside North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, observing military hardware in a parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in September. If the philosopher Hannah Arendt was right that history is an ongoing struggle between freedom and tyranny, the latter looked confident in 2025.

Yet, even in the worst of times, the idea of freedom and human rights is enduring. People power remains an engine for change. In the US, “No Kings” marches have drawn millions, protesters in Chicago, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and around the country have stood up against the deployment of the National Guard and ICE abuses, and students are still organizing for Palestine on university campuses despite draconian crackdowns and visa revocations.

Buoyed by popular resistance, South Korean parliamentarians impeached their president to prevent him from grabbing power through martial law. Grassroots aid efforts by Sudan’s emergency response rooms, Hong Kong’s fire relief, Sri Lanka’s cyclone relief community kitchens, and Ukrainian mutual aid and solidarity collectives represent the best of this trend.

In 2025, Gen Z protests against corruption, inadequate public services, and poor governance in Nepal, Indonesia, and Morocco brought to the forefront the need for governments to listen to their youth and tackle corruption and inequality. But as the difficulties of restoring rights in Bangladesh after years under an authoritarian government illustrates, gains won through public mobilization can easily be lost unless democratic participation and free expression remain unassailable.