US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, June 4, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, June 4, 2026.
The global human rights system is in peril. Under relentless pressure from US President Donald Trump, and persistently undermined by China and Russia, the rules-based international order is being crushed, threatening to take with it the architecture human rights defenders have come to rely on to advance norms and protect freedoms. To defy this trend, governments that still value human rights, alongside social movements, civil society, and international institutions, need to form a strategic alliance to push back.
To be fair, the downward spiral predated Trump’s reelection. The democratic wave that began over 50 years ago has given way to what scholars term a “democratic recession.” Democracy is now back to 1985 levels according to some metrics, with 72 percent of the world’s population now living under autocracy. Russia and China are less free today than 20 years ago. And so is the United States.
Of course, democracy is not a panacea for human rights violations; the US and other longtime democracies have their own histories of colonial crimes, racism, abusive justice systems, and wartime atrocities. More recently, authoritarian leaders have exploited public mistrust and anger to win elections and then dismantled the very institutions that brought them to power. Democratic institutions are crucial to represent the will of the people and keep power in check. It’s no surprise that whenever democracy is undermined, rights are too, as evident in recent years in India, Türkiye, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Hungary.
FIRST: The Momentum Movement’s parliamentary representative David Bedo and independent member of parliament Akos Hadhazy protest against a law that bans Pride marches in Hungary and imposes fines on organizers and attendees of such events, Budapest, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Marton Monus/Reuters; SECOND: University students confront riot police in Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Ozan Köse/AFP via Getty Images
In this context, 2025 may be seen as a tipping point. In just 12 months, the Trump administration has carried out a broad assault on key pillars of US democracy and the global rules-based order, which the US, despite inconsistencies, was, with other states, instrumental in helping to establish.
In short order, Trump’s second-term administration has undermined trust in the sanctity of elections, reduced government accountability, gutted food assistance and healthcare subsidies, attacked judicial independence, defied court orders, rolled back women’s rights, obstructed access to abortion care, undermined remedies for racial harm, terminated programs mandating accessibility for people with disabilities, punished free speech, stripped protections from trans and intersex people, eroded privacy, and used government power to intimidate political opponents, the media, law firms, universities, civil society, and even comedians.
Claiming a risk of “civilizational erasure” in Europe and leaning on racist tropes to cast entire populations as unwelcome in the US, the Trump administration has embraced policies and rhetoric that align with white nationalist ideology. Immigrants and asylum seekers have been subjected to inhumane conditions and degrading treatment; 32 died in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody in 2025, and as of mid-January 2026, an additional 4 have died. Masked immigration enforcement agents have targeted people of color, using excessive force, terrorizing communities, wrongfully arresting scores of citizens, and, most recently, unjustifiably killing two people in Minneapolis, whose deaths Human Rights Watch has documented.
The US president of course has the authority to tighten US borders and enforce stricter immigration policies. The administration is not, however, entitled to deny legal process to asylum seekers, mistreat undocumented migrants, or unlawfully discriminate. In a well-functioning democracy, no electoral mandate should supersede domestic legislation, constitutional protections, or international human rights law. Trump’s team has repeatedly bypassed these guardrails.
The violations have not stopped at the border. The Trump administration used a 1798 law to send hundreds of Venezuelan migrants to an infamous prison in El Salvador, where they were tortured and sexually abused. Its blatantly unlawful strikes on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific extrajudicially killed more than 120 people whom Trump claims were drug traffickers.
US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, June 4, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, June 4, 2026.
After the US attacked Venezuela and apprehended its president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump claimed the US would “run” the country and control its vast oil reserves. Despite paying lip service to human rights concerns under Maduro at the United Nations, Trump has worked with the same repressive apparatus to further US interests. Many Western allies have chosen to stay silent about these lawless moves, perhaps fearing erratic tariffs and blowback to their alliances.
Trump’s foreign policy has upended the foundations of the rules-based order that seeks to advance democracy and human rights, even if imperfectly.
Trump has boasted that he doesn’t “need international law” as a constraint, only his “own morality.” His administration has politicized the US State Department’s annual human rights report, stepped away from the global prohibition on antipersonnel landmines, voiced support for rewriting international rules on asylum, and skipped the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of the US’ human rights record.
His administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization and plans to quit 66 international organizations and programs that it describes as part of an “outdated model of multilateralism,” including key forums for climate negotiations. It has eviscerated US aid programs that provided a lifeline to children, older people and those needing health care, LGBT people, women, and human rights defenders, and withheld most of its UN dues.
Trump has also emboldened autocrats and undermined democratic allies. While admonishing some elected Western European leaders, he and senior officials have expressed admiration for Europe’s nativist far right. He has favored autocrats such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, while continuing decades of US support to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
His administration has unjustifiably imposed sanctions to punish respected Palestinian human rights organizations, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor and many of its judges, a UN special rapporteur, and for several months, a Brazilian Supreme Court judge and his wife.
The institutional response in the US to Trump’s power grabs has been shockingly muted. Much of Congress, controlled by his own party, has not challenged his supercharged expansion of executive power. The leaders of the US’ most powerful technology companies have made significant donations and sought to placate the president. Some big law firms and prestigious universities have made deals rather than assert their independence, and some media organizations seem afraid to attract the president’s ire.
Has the US switched sides on the human rights playing field? While US engagement with human rights institutions has always been selective, China and Russia have long pursued an illiberal agenda. They stand much to gain from a US government that now expresses open hostility to universal rights. China and Russia remain strategic rivals of the US, but all three countries are now led by leaders who share open disdain for norms and institutions that could constrain their power.
Police detain an activist outside the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, before lawmakers approved a bill that punishes online searches for information that is deemed “extremist,” in Moscow, June 4, 2026.
Together, they wield considerable economic, military, and diplomatic power. If they were to consistently act as allies of convenience to erode global rules, they could threaten the entire system. Already, a loose international network of countries such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar, Cuba, and Belarus work in concert with Russia and China. These leaders share very little ideologically but align in undermining human rights and promoting a regressive international agenda. In word and in practice, the US government is now helping them in this endeavor.
FIRST: Surveillance cameras installed in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Kyodo News via Getty Images; SECOND: A television in a restaurant in Hong Kong shows a missile being launched during military exercises being held by China around the island of Taiwan, June 4, 2026. © 2022 Isaac Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images
The US’ weakening of multilateral institutions also dealt a serious blow to global efforts to prevent or stop grave international crimes. The “never again” movement, born from the horrors of the Holocaust and reignited by the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, spurred the UN General Assembly to embrace the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. Meant to guide international intervention to prevent and stop atrocities in tandem with efforts to prosecute and punish serious crimes, R2P made a real difference in places like the Central African Republic and Kenya.
Today, R2P is rarely invoked and the ICC is under siege. In addition to Trump’s far-reaching sanctions, in December 2025 a Moscow court sentenced the ICC prosecutor and eight of its judges to prison terms in absentia. Moreover, despite being ICC fugitives, in 2025, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was welcomed by Donald Trump in Alaska, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Hungary, an ICC member state at the time, at Orban’s invitation.
Twenty years ago, the US government and civil society were instrumental in galvanizing a response to mass atrocities in Darfur. Sudan is burning again, but this time under Trump, with relative impunity. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which emerged from the militias that led the prior ethnic cleansing campaign, are again committing murder and rape on a mass scale. A growing body of evidence indicates that the UAE, a longtime US ally that recently made multi-billion-dollar deals with Trump, is providing the RSF with military support.
A former bus station turned into internally displaced person settlement in Gedaref, Sudan, June 4, 2026.
In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israeli armed forces have committed acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, killing over 70,000 people since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and displacing the vast majority of Gaza’s population. These crimes were met with uneven global condemnation and not nearly enough action. Some countries halted or temporarily paused weapons sales to Israel in response or sanctioned Israeli ministers. Trump, however, continued a long-standing US policy of almost unconditional support to Israel, even as the International Court of Justice is weighing allegations of genocide and has issued binding orders under the Genocide Convention to protect Palestinians’ rights.
Trump announced in February an alarming US plan to transform Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East” free of Palestinians, which would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing. As implementation of the 20-point Trump peace plan has stalled, the administration has further normalized the dispossession of Palestinians through its failure to publicly protest Israel’s regular killing of those approaching the “yellow line” that now divides Gaza, its ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes, and unlawful restrictions on humanitarian aid.
FIRST: A Palestinian girl stands amidst rubble in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Bashar Taleb/AFP via Getty Images; SECOND: Palestinians inspect a house demolished by Israeli military forces in the town of Qabatiya in the Israeli occupied West Bank, June 4, 2026. © 2025 Nasser Ishtayeh/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
In Ukraine, Trump’s peace efforts have consistently downplayed Russia’s responsibility for serious violations. These include indiscriminate bombing, coercing Ukrainians in occupied areas to serve in the Russian military, systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war, the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the use of quadcopter drones to hunt and kill civilians. Rather than applying meaningful pressure on Putin to end these crimes, Trump publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a made-for-TV dressing down, demanded an exploitative mineral deal, pressured Ukraine’s authorities to concede large swaths of territory, and proposed “full amnesty” for war crimes.
The message is clear: in Trump’s new world disorder, might makes right and atrocities are not dealbreakers.
A man stands in the courtyard of his house following a Russian strike on the outskirts of Odesa, Ukraine, June 4, 2026.
`삼촌`은 잘못된 호칭`작은아버지`로 불러야. 네이버 블로그 전체보기 1,815개의 글 목록열기. 굳이 비교를 하자면 우리나라한국에서 사용하는 큰아버지, 작은아버지, 삼촌은 모두 아버지의 형제를 가리키는 말이지만, 그 나이 순서와 가족 내 위치에 따라. 촌수로는 삼촌맞는데 엄마쪽 남자형제분을 삼촌이라 하는 read more.
네이버 블로그 전체보기 1,815개의 글 목록열기.. ※ 국립국어원 「표준언어예절」2011.. 저희 자식들은 형한테 큰아버지라고 부르나요..외삼촌이나 삼촌, 작은아버지 또는 큰아버지 모두 다 우리가 따지는 항렬로 따지면 삼촌三寸인데 상황에 따라서 모두 다르게 불리고내가 부를 때. 큰아빠 means your farthers elder brother. 지방에 따라서 약간의 차이가 있지만 숙부 叔父삼촌 三寸아재라고도 한다. 현대 사회의 다양한 가족 형태와 그들을 위한 법적, 사회적 지원 정책의 현황을 깊이 있게 들여다봅니다. `삼촌`은 잘못된 호칭`작은아버지`로 불러야, 삼촌과 작은아빠, 숙부의 차이를 알아보고, 이어 외삼촌과 외숙모란 호칭의 잘못 쓰임도 짚어봅니다. 반면, ‘숙부 叔父’는 아버지의 남동생을 의미하며, 결혼 여부와 관계없이 사용돼요, 굳이 비교를 하자면 우리나라한국에서 사용하는 큰아버지, 작은아버지, 삼촌은 모두 아버지의 형제를 가리키는 말이지만, 그 나이 순서와 가족 내 위치에 따라. 주의사항 고모 직계 남성의 자매들은 절대 內를 붙이지 않는다, 지방에 따라서 약간의 차이가 있지만 숙부叔父삼촌三寸아재라고도 한다. 큰아버지, 작은아버지 등으로 불러야 한다. 다음으로 3촌 관계에 대해서 살펴볼게요, 여러분은 어렸을 때 헷갈리는 호칭이 없었나요. 아버지의 남동생을 부르는 말은 미혼이냐 기혼이냐에 관계없이 작은아버지 아저씨 삼촌이다. 호칭은 집안의 어른이 결정해서 큰 아빠라고 부르라고 하면 따르는게 좋습니다. 큰아빠 keun appa, 백부 baekbu, 그리고 중부 joongbu의 차이점이 뭔데.
아버지의 형은 ‘큰아버지’ 또는 ‘백부 伯父’라고 부르며, 결혼 여부와 상관없이 같은 명칭을 사용해요, 하지만 어머니에게 남자 형제가 있을 때도 삼촌정식명칭은 외삼촌으로 불러온 탓에 헷갈린 경우가 많았다, 저희가 자녀가있는데자녀가 남편의 형에게 큰아빠라고 불러야되는게 맞는데, 위에형이 저희자녀들한테 자꾸 삼촌삼촌이라고 부릅.
아버지의 형제자매 중에서 아버지보다 나이가 많은 남자형제를 가리키는 친족용어. 삼촌이라고 부르기에는 맞지 않다고 할 수 있습니다, Days ago knowing korean family terms is important to properly address your korean relatives and friends.
| 관념상 보통 삼촌 이라고 하면 큰 아버지, 작은 아버지 보다 어린 나이대로 들리기는 합니다. | 여러분은 어렸을 때 헷갈리는 호칭이 없었나요. | 보통 아버지의 형은 큰아버지, 아버지의 동생은 작은아버지라 부른다. | 저희가 자녀가있는데자녀가 남편의 형에게 큰아빠라고 불러야되는게 맞는데, 위에형이 저희자녀들한테 자꾸 삼촌삼촌이라고 부릅. |
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| Com › mmun2375 › 221371160986외삼촌, 삼촌 작은아버지 어떤 말이 맞을까요. | 반면, ‘숙부 叔父’는 아버지의 남동생을 의미하며, 결혼 여부와 관계없이 사용돼요. | 저희남편이 2형제가 있는데 위에형이있고남편이 동생입니다. | 3촌의 경우는 나와 증조할머니, 증조할아버지의 관계, 그리고 나와 부모님의 형제자매인 어른의 관계를 3촌이라고 하는데요, 위아래로 움직일 때마다 1칸 1촌 이동, 수평으로 움직이면 2칸 2촌 이동이라는 점을 기억하면 먼저 증조부증조모는 나를. |
| 아빠의 형한테 삼촌이라 부르는경우 있나요. | 작은아빠 삼촌 is your mothers brother 큰 삼촌. | 큰, 작은 아빠 your dads big, little brother if hethey are married. | 지방에 따라서 약간의 차이가 있지만 숙부 叔父삼촌 三寸아재라고도 한다. |
| 물론 역으로 나와 내 형제의 자식과의 촌수도 3촌이다. | 저희 자식들은 형한테 큰아버지라고 부르나요. | 따라서 아버지의 형제가 다섯인데 아버지가 그 가운데 셋째라면, ①은 《큰아버지》 또는 《첫째 큰아버지》 ②는 《큰아버지》 또는. | 본인이 남자라면 조카가 본인을 삼촌이라 부를 수 있다. |
지방에 따라서 약간의 차이가 있지만 숙부 叔父삼촌 三寸아재라고도 한다, 형제간이 2촌이고 부모자식간은 1촌이기 때문, 아버지의 동생은 결혼하지 않으면 삼촌. 즉 고모나 이모도 촌수를 따지면 3촌이다, 저도 일부러 사전을 찾지 않고 알고있는 그대로 썼어요. Com › qna › dirs큰아버지 큰아빠와 삼촌은 같은존칭인가요.
그러나 고모의 후손들은 내종사촌 고종사촌 이런식으로 두가지 호칭을. 큰아빠, 백부, 그리고 중부의 차이점이 뭔데. 하지만 어머니에게 남자 형제가 있을 때도 삼촌정식명칭은 외삼촌으로 불러온 탓에 헷갈린 경우가 많았다. 물론 역으로 나와 내 형제의 자식과의 촌수도 3촌이다.
예전에는 가족하면 당연히 떠오르던 모습들이 있었지만. 삼촌은 아버지의 남자 형제를 통칭하는 단어로, 미혼인 경우에 주로 사용됩니다, 굳이 비교를 하자면 우리나라한국에서 사용하는 큰아버지, 작은아버지, 삼촌은 모두 아버지의 형제를 가리키는 말이지만, 그 나이 순서와 가족 내 위치에 따라. 현기영 작가의 이 수능 모의고사에 지문으로 나온 적이 있었는데, 삼촌이라고 불리는 인물이 문맥상으로는 아무리 봐도 여자여서 타 지역 학생들이 멘붕을 겪었다는 이야기가 전해진다.
외삼촌이나 삼촌, 작은아버지 또는 큰아버지 모두 다 우리가 따지는 항렬로 따지면 삼촌三寸인데 상황에 따라서 모두 다르게 불리고내가 부를 때. 아버지의 형제들에 대한 호칭 상식의 허실. 아빠의 형한테 삼촌이라 부르는경우 있나요, 잘 알아두었다가 필요할 때 요긴하게 사용하세요, 영어 호칭은 생각보다 쉽게 정리될 수 있습니다.
url.avsee. e 이는 삼촌보다 더 가까운 관계를 의미하거나 친밀감을 표현하고 싶을 때 사용하는 경우가 있습니다. 굳이 비교를 하자면 우리나라한국에서 사용하는 큰아버지, 작은아버지, 삼촌은 모두 아버지의 형제를 가리키는 말이지만, 그 나이 순서와 가족 내 위치에 따라. 3촌의 경우는 나와 증조할머니, 증조할아버지의 관계, 그리고 나와 부모님의 형제자매인 어른의 관계를 3촌이라고 하는데요, 위아래로 움직일 때마다 1칸 1촌 이동, 수평으로 움직이면 2칸 2촌 이동이라는 점을 기억하면 먼저 증조부증조모는 나를. Com › entry › 가족관계명칭가족관계 명칭 총정리. 아빠의 형한테 삼촌이라 부르는경우 있나요. virtual youtuber
twit nouru Com › postview삼촌과 작은아빠 차이를 아세요. 구분해 주고 싶으면 큰아버지는 older uncle, 작은아버지는 younger uncle, 친삼촌은 paternal uncle, 외삼촌은 maternal uncle이라 할 수 있지만, 어디 read more. 요즘 명절이야 일가친척을 만나는 것과는 거리가 멉니다. 호칭은 집안의 어른이 결정해서 큰 아빠라고 부르라고 하면 따르는게 좋습니다. 큰아빠, 백부, 그리고 중부의 차이점이 뭔데. twi-dougaリアルタイム100
want2fuc 큰아빠, 백부, 그리고 중부의 차이점이 뭔데. 굳이 비교를 하자면 우리나라한국에서 사용하는 큰아버지, 작은아버지, 삼촌은 모두 아버지의 형제를 가리키는 말이지만, 그 나이 순서와 가족 내 위치에 따라. 결혼 하셨다면 큰아버지로 부르는 것이라고 하네요. 삼촌이라고 부르기에는 맞지 않다고 할 수 있습니다. 삼촌은 단순히 나와 아버지 형제의 촌수를 나타내는 거지 호칭도 지칭도 아니다. twividouga
twidinga 아빠보다 손위인 쓰니 삼촌이 결혼하시면 큰아빠가 되는거지. 주의사항 고모 직계 남성의 자매들은 절대 內를 붙이지 않는다. 이는 삼촌보다 더 가까운 관계를 의미하거나 친밀감을 표현하고 싶을 때 사용하는 경우가 있습니다. 결론적으로, 아빠의 친구를 삼촌이라고 부르는 것이 일반적이지만, 특정 상황이나 개인의 선호에 따라 큰아빠라고 부르는 경우도 있습니다. 결혼 하셨다면 큰아버지로 부르는 것이라고 하네요.
watson 온라인 영어 호칭은 생각보다 쉽게 정리될 수 있습니다. 큰 아버지, 작은 아버지하면 삼촌보다는 되게 나이들어. Com › mmun2375 › 221371160986외삼촌, 삼촌 작은아버지 어떤 말이 맞을까요. 굳이 비교를 하자면 우리나라한국에서 사용하는 큰아버지, 작은아버지, 삼촌은 모두 아버지의 형제를 가리키는 말이지만, 그 나이 순서와 가족 내 위치에 따라. 다음으로 3촌 관계에 대해서 살펴볼게요.
Security personnel stand guard during a curfew imposed after protesters clashed with security forces in Imphal, Manipur, India, on June 4, 2026.
This global coalition of rights-respecting democracies could offer other incentives to counter Trump’s policies that have undermined multilateral trade governance and reciprocal trade agreements that included rights protections. Attractive trade deals, with meaningful rights protections for workers, and security agreements could be conditioned on adhering to democratic governance and human rights norms. Democracy already comes with benefits. While autocracies have generally fostered conflict, economic stagnation, or kleptocracy, as evidenced in multiple academic studies, including the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Daron Acemoglu, democratic institutions reliably yield economic growth.
This new rights-based alliance would also be a powerful voting bloc at the UN. It could commit to defending the independence and integrity of UN human rights mechanisms, providing political and financial support, and building coalitions capable of advancing democratic norms, even when opposed by superpowers.
Effectively mobilizing governments to form such an alliance will not happen without strategic engagement from civil society and constituencies inside those countries who can help raise the priority of a rights-based foreign policy. These governments will need to be convinced that they have both an interest and a responsibility to protect the rules-based system.
Projects of this nature are bubbling up. Chile, which had a principled foreign policy focused on rights under President Gabriel Boric, hosted in July 2025 a presidential-level “Democracy Forever” summit, where leaders from Spain, Uruguay, Colombia, and Brazil pledged to engage in “active democratic diplomacy” based on shared values.
The Hague Group, led by Malaysia, South Africa, and Colombia, formed in January 2025 in “defense of international law” and in solidarity with Palestinians. Over 70 countries from all regions signed a joint statement defending multilateralism at the UN. Earlier, in 2017, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen set up the Alliance of Democracies Foundation to rally the dwindling ranks of democratic countries to “support each other against authoritarian pressures.”
Whatever its precise contours, an alliance of rights-respecting democracies would offer a hopeful counterpoint to the authoritarian trope of China’s and Russia’s leaders standing alongside North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, observing military hardware in a parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in September. If the philosopher Hannah Arendt was right that history is an ongoing struggle between freedom and tyranny, the latter looked confident in 2025.
Yet, even in the worst of times, the idea of freedom and human rights is enduring. People power remains an engine for change. In the US, “No Kings” marches have drawn millions, protesters in Chicago, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and around the country have stood up against the deployment of the National Guard and ICE abuses, and students are still organizing for Palestine on university campuses despite draconian crackdowns and visa revocations.
People gather facing law enforcement after marching through downtown Austin, Texas at the conclusion of the "No Kings Day" demonstration in the US, June 4, 2026.
Buoyed by popular resistance, South Korean parliamentarians impeached their president to prevent him from grabbing power through martial law. Grassroots aid efforts by Sudan’s emergency response rooms, Hong Kong’s fire relief, Sri Lanka’s cyclone relief community kitchens, and Ukrainian mutual aid and solidarity collectives represent the best of this trend.
In 2025, Gen Z protests against corruption, inadequate public services, and poor governance in Nepal, Indonesia, and Morocco brought to the forefront the need for governments to listen to their youth and tackle corruption and inequality. But as the difficulties of restoring rights in Bangladesh after years under an authoritarian government illustrates, gains won through public mobilization can easily be lost unless democratic participation and free expression remain unassailable.
People take part in a youth-led protest against corruption and calling for education and healthcare reforms, in Rabat, Morocco, June 4, 2026.
Demonstrators outside Nepal's Parliament during a protest in Kathmandu condemning social media prohibitions and corruption by the government, June 4, 2026.
In this more hostile world, civil society is more critical than ever. It’s also increasingly endangered, particularly in an environment where funding is scarce. In 2025, Human Rights Watch was labeled “undesirable” and banned from operating in Russia. For partners in Egypt, Hong Kong, and India, these tactics are all too familiar. Restrictions on civil society and protest have become more commonplace in Europe, including the UK and France. And now, for the first time, many worry about risks associated with their operational presence in the US, where the Open Society Foundations, a major donor, have already been threatened, and the administration is preparing a list of “domestic terrorists” under overbroad guidance that could be interpreted to include the work of many progressive groups.
Breaking the authoritarian wave and standing up for human rights is a generational challenge. In 2026, it will play out most acutely in the US, with far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world. Fighting back will require a determined, strategic, and coordinated reaction from voters, civil society, multilateral institutions, and rights-respecting governments around the globe.
큰아빠 means your farthers elder brother., Human Rights Watch’s 36th annual review of human rights practices and trends around the globe, reviews developments in more than 100 countries.