US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, August 1, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, August 1, 2026.
The global human rights system is in peril. Under relentless pressure from US President Donald Trump, and persistently undermined by China and Russia, the rules-based international order is being crushed, threatening to take with it the architecture human rights defenders have come to rely on to advance norms and protect freedoms. To defy this trend, governments that still value human rights, alongside social movements, civil society, and international institutions, need to form a strategic alliance to push back.
To be fair, the downward spiral predated Trump’s reelection. The democratic wave that began over 50 years ago has given way to what scholars term a “democratic recession.” Democracy is now back to 1985 levels according to some metrics, with 72 percent of the world’s population now living under autocracy. Russia and China are less free today than 20 years ago. And so is the United States.
Of course, democracy is not a panacea for human rights violations; the US and other longtime democracies have their own histories of colonial crimes, racism, abusive justice systems, and wartime atrocities. More recently, authoritarian leaders have exploited public mistrust and anger to win elections and then dismantled the very institutions that brought them to power. Democratic institutions are crucial to represent the will of the people and keep power in check. It’s no surprise that whenever democracy is undermined, rights are too, as evident in recent years in India, Türkiye, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Hungary.
FIRST: The Momentum Movement’s parliamentary representative David Bedo and independent member of parliament Akos Hadhazy protest against a law that bans Pride marches in Hungary and imposes fines on organizers and attendees of such events, Budapest, August 1, 2026. © 2025 Marton Monus/Reuters; SECOND: University students confront riot police in Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, August 1, 2026. © 2025 Ozan Köse/AFP via Getty Images
In this context, 2025 may be seen as a tipping point. In just 12 months, the Trump administration has carried out a broad assault on key pillars of US democracy and the global rules-based order, which the US, despite inconsistencies, was, with other states, instrumental in helping to establish.
In short order, Trump’s second-term administration has undermined trust in the sanctity of elections, reduced government accountability, gutted food assistance and healthcare subsidies, attacked judicial independence, defied court orders, rolled back women’s rights, obstructed access to abortion care, undermined remedies for racial harm, terminated programs mandating accessibility for people with disabilities, punished free speech, stripped protections from trans and intersex people, eroded privacy, and used government power to intimidate political opponents, the media, law firms, universities, civil society, and even comedians.
Claiming a risk of “civilizational erasure” in Europe and leaning on racist tropes to cast entire populations as unwelcome in the US, the Trump administration has embraced policies and rhetoric that align with white nationalist ideology. Immigrants and asylum seekers have been subjected to inhumane conditions and degrading treatment; 32 died in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody in 2025, and as of mid-January 2026, an additional 4 have died. Masked immigration enforcement agents have targeted people of color, using excessive force, terrorizing communities, wrongfully arresting scores of citizens, and, most recently, unjustifiably killing two people in Minneapolis, whose deaths Human Rights Watch has documented.
The US president of course has the authority to tighten US borders and enforce stricter immigration policies. The administration is not, however, entitled to deny legal process to asylum seekers, mistreat undocumented migrants, or unlawfully discriminate. In a well-functioning democracy, no electoral mandate should supersede domestic legislation, constitutional protections, or international human rights law. Trump’s team has repeatedly bypassed these guardrails.
The violations have not stopped at the border. The Trump administration used a 1798 law to send hundreds of Venezuelan migrants to an infamous prison in El Salvador, where they were tortured and sexually abused. Its blatantly unlawful strikes on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific extrajudicially killed more than 120 people whom Trump claims were drug traffickers.
US Border Patrol Cmdr. Gregory Bovino (C) walks through a department store in St. Paul, Minnesota, August 1, 2026.
A Venezuelan migrant sits inside a cell at CECOT prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador, August 1, 2026.
After the US attacked Venezuela and apprehended its president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump claimed the US would “run” the country and control its vast oil reserves. Despite paying lip service to human rights concerns under Maduro at the United Nations, Trump has worked with the same repressive apparatus to further US interests. Many Western allies have chosen to stay silent about these lawless moves, perhaps fearing erratic tariffs and blowback to their alliances.
Trump’s foreign policy has upended the foundations of the rules-based order that seeks to advance democracy and human rights, even if imperfectly.
Trump has boasted that he doesn’t “need international law” as a constraint, only his “own morality.” His administration has politicized the US State Department’s annual human rights report, stepped away from the global prohibition on antipersonnel landmines, voiced support for rewriting international rules on asylum, and skipped the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of the US’ human rights record.
His administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization and plans to quit 66 international organizations and programs that it describes as part of an “outdated model of multilateralism,” including key forums for climate negotiations. It has eviscerated US aid programs that provided a lifeline to children, older people and those needing health care, LGBT people, women, and human rights defenders, and withheld most of its UN dues.
Trump has also emboldened autocrats and undermined democratic allies. While admonishing some elected Western European leaders, he and senior officials have expressed admiration for Europe’s nativist far right. He has favored autocrats such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, while continuing decades of US support to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
His administration has unjustifiably imposed sanctions to punish respected Palestinian human rights organizations, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor and many of its judges, a UN special rapporteur, and for several months, a Brazilian Supreme Court judge and his wife.
The institutional response in the US to Trump’s power grabs has been shockingly muted. Much of Congress, controlled by his own party, has not challenged his supercharged expansion of executive power. The leaders of the US’ most powerful technology companies have made significant donations and sought to placate the president. Some big law firms and prestigious universities have made deals rather than assert their independence, and some media organizations seem afraid to attract the president’s ire.
Has the US switched sides on the human rights playing field? While US engagement with human rights institutions has always been selective, China and Russia have long pursued an illiberal agenda. They stand much to gain from a US government that now expresses open hostility to universal rights. China and Russia remain strategic rivals of the US, but all three countries are now led by leaders who share open disdain for norms and institutions that could constrain their power.
Police detain an activist outside the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, before lawmakers approved a bill that punishes online searches for information that is deemed “extremist,” in Moscow, August 1, 2026.
Together, they wield considerable economic, military, and diplomatic power. If they were to consistently act as allies of convenience to erode global rules, they could threaten the entire system. Already, a loose international network of countries such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar, Cuba, and Belarus work in concert with Russia and China. These leaders share very little ideologically but align in undermining human rights and promoting a regressive international agenda. In word and in practice, the US government is now helping them in this endeavor.
FIRST: Surveillance cameras installed in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, August 1, 2026. © 2025 Kyodo News via Getty Images; SECOND: A television in a restaurant in Hong Kong shows a missile being launched during military exercises being held by China around the island of Taiwan, August 1, 2026. © 2022 Isaac Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images
The US’ weakening of multilateral institutions also dealt a serious blow to global efforts to prevent or stop grave international crimes. The “never again” movement, born from the horrors of the Holocaust and reignited by the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, spurred the UN General Assembly to embrace the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. Meant to guide international intervention to prevent and stop atrocities in tandem with efforts to prosecute and punish serious crimes, R2P made a real difference in places like the Central African Republic and Kenya.
Today, R2P is rarely invoked and the ICC is under siege. In addition to Trump’s far-reaching sanctions, in December 2025 a Moscow court sentenced the ICC prosecutor and eight of its judges to prison terms in absentia. Moreover, despite being ICC fugitives, in 2025, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was welcomed by Donald Trump in Alaska, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Hungary, an ICC member state at the time, at Orban’s invitation.
Twenty years ago, the US government and civil society were instrumental in galvanizing a response to mass atrocities in Darfur. Sudan is burning again, but this time under Trump, with relative impunity. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which emerged from the militias that led the prior ethnic cleansing campaign, are again committing murder and rape on a mass scale. A growing body of evidence indicates that the UAE, a longtime US ally that recently made multi-billion-dollar deals with Trump, is providing the RSF with military support.
A former bus station turned into internally displaced person settlement in Gedaref, Sudan, August 1, 2026.
In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israeli armed forces have committed acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, killing over 70,000 people since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and displacing the vast majority of Gaza’s population. These crimes were met with uneven global condemnation and not nearly enough action. Some countries halted or temporarily paused weapons sales to Israel in response or sanctioned Israeli ministers. Trump, however, continued a long-standing US policy of almost unconditional support to Israel, even as the International Court of Justice is weighing allegations of genocide and has issued binding orders under the Genocide Convention to protect Palestinians’ rights.
Trump announced in February an alarming US plan to transform Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East” free of Palestinians, which would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing. As implementation of the 20-point Trump peace plan has stalled, the administration has further normalized the dispossession of Palestinians through its failure to publicly protest Israel’s regular killing of those approaching the “yellow line” that now divides Gaza, its ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes, and unlawful restrictions on humanitarian aid.
FIRST: A Palestinian girl stands amidst rubble in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, August 1, 2026. © 2025 Bashar Taleb/AFP via Getty Images; SECOND: Palestinians inspect a house demolished by Israeli military forces in the town of Qabatiya in the Israeli occupied West Bank, August 1, 2026. © 2025 Nasser Ishtayeh/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
In Ukraine, Trump’s peace efforts have consistently downplayed Russia’s responsibility for serious violations. These include indiscriminate bombing, coercing Ukrainians in occupied areas to serve in the Russian military, systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war, the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the use of quadcopter drones to hunt and kill civilians. Rather than applying meaningful pressure on Putin to end these crimes, Trump publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a made-for-TV dressing down, demanded an exploitative mineral deal, pressured Ukraine’s authorities to concede large swaths of territory, and proposed “full amnesty” for war crimes.
The message is clear: in Trump’s new world disorder, might makes right and atrocities are not dealbreakers.
A man stands in the courtyard of his house following a Russian strike on the outskirts of Odesa, Ukraine, August 1, 2026.
1901년에 창단하여 1920년에 efl 에 참가하기 전까지 서던 리그에서 뛰었다. 스포조이 축구 비교분석 브라이턴ha vs 에버턴. 15161718 9월 24일, 발레바는. 1901년에 창단하여 1920년에 efl 에 참가하기 전까지 서던 리그에서 뛰었다.
브라이턴은 202324시즌 epl에서 11위12승12무14패를 기록했다. 잉글랜드 first division 9192. We are a thriving multicampus university in the south of england, uk. Brighton and hove albion wfc. 파비안 휘르첼러 파비안 마르크 휘르첼러 fabian marc hürzeler, 1993년 2월 26일 는 독일의 축구 감독이자 전 축구 선수이다. 여름철이 성수기이며 브라이턴 프린지, 브라이턴 프라이드, 브라이턴 모드 위켄더와 같은 축제가 열리는 시즌이기도 합니다. 결승전에서는 맨체스터 유나이티드 에게 패배하였다, เอฟเอ วีเมนส์ ซูเปอร์ลีก.Brighton 22 chelsea final score.. 67 이후 2024년 1월 포르투갈의 방송사 cmtv 는 요케레스가 포르투갈의 배우 이네스 아기아르 와 사귀고 있다고 보도했다.. Com스포조이 축구 비교분석 브라이턴ha vs 에버턴.. The club competes in the premier league, the top tier of english football..
Full match highlights from chelsea womens 03 wsl away victory against brighton and hove albion women. Find match dates, opponents, kickoff times, and venue details for all league, cup, and friendly games, 프리미어 리그 소속 브라이튼 앤 호브 알비온 fc 의 202223 시즌 행보에 관해 설명하는 문서. 브라이튼 앤 호브 알비온 fc vs 토트넘 홋스퍼 프리미어리그, Womens super league leaders chelsea earned a 22 draw at brighton & hove albion on sunday, while manchester united closed the gap at the top of the standings.
Full match brighton & hove albion v chelsea barclays. 브라이튼을 대표하는 명소이자 해변가에 설치된 놀이기구, 게임센터, 펍, 레스토랑 등이 있는 테마파크입니다. Brighton & hove albion football club, commonly referred to as brighton, is a professional football club based in brighton and hove, east sussex, england. Real madrid liga f 202526 matchday 11 full match, 이 클럽은 1979년부터 1983년까지 전성기를 누렸는데.
Ukuniversity of brighton, 🎬💙 this is the official youtube channel for brighton & hove albion fc where. Brighton women 03 chelsea women highlights wsl.
| Explore the latest team roster, including goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders, and forwards, as well as player profiles, stats, and recent transfers for the 202526 season. | 17세기 까지 상대적으로 번영하였으나 18세기에 이르러 어류 수요감소와 침식으로 인해 쇠퇴하기 시작해 18세기 중반 인구가 약 2000명까지 감소하였다. | 2m followers, 269 following, 14k posts brighton & hove albion fc @officialbhafc on instagram the official brighton & hove albion account. | Thompson on top with goal and assist brighton & hove. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brightonandhovealbion premierleague all the key moments from newcastle uniteds visit to the amex. | 일본의 간판 윙어 미토마 가오루28의 몸값이 천정부지로 솟고 있다. | We are a thriving multicampus university in the south of england, uk. | 잉글랜드 fa 컵 맨체스터 유나이티드 축구 클럽 브라이턴 & 호브 앨비언 fc. |
| Real madrid liga f 202526 matchday 11 full match. | Full match brighton vs chelsea video official site. | 잉글랜드 first division 9192. | 브라이튼 앤 호브 알비온 fc 의 202425 시즌 행보에 관해 설명하는 문서. |
| 브라이턴 구단은 16일한국시간 독일 출신의 파비안 휘르첼러 감독을 영입했다고 발표했다. | เฉพาะบนแอป livescore เท่านั้น. | 같은 해에 그들은 1부 리그에서 강등을 당하였고, 그 후 미숙한. | Chelsea fc vs brighton and hove albion wfc live scores. |
2m followers, 269 following, 14k posts brighton & hove albion fc @officialbhafc on instagram the official brighton & hove albion account. Explore our subjects and search for undergraduate or postgraduate degree courses. 7월 17일 토리노 제노아 분석 세리에a 7월 17일 발렌시아 에스파뇰 분석 라리가 7월 17일 헤타페 아틀레티코 마드리드 분석 라리가 7월 17일 사우샘프턴 브라이턴 분석 프리미어리그 7월 17일 에이바르 바야돌리드 분석 라리가 7월 17일 에버턴 애스턴빌라 분석 프리, Founded in 1901, brighton played their early, 프리미어 리그 소속 브라이튼 앤 호브 알비온 fc 의 202223 시즌 행보에 관해 설명하는 문서. Highlights in partnership with @mpbcom.
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🎬💙 this is the official youtube channel for brighton & hove albion fc where.. 중심 도시는 브라이턴 이며 면적은 87.. รายการโปรด chelsea fc..
브라이턴 & 호브 앨비언 2022년 6월 24일, 아딩라는 프리미어리그 의 브라이턴 & 호브 앨비언 으로 이적하여 4년 계약을 체결했다. Tən ⓘ, brytən is a seaside resort in the unitary authority area of brighton and hove, in east sussex, england, 47 miles 76 km south of london, 15161718 9월 24일, 발레바는. 이는 18세기 후반 영국 왕실의 후원으로 휴양지 개발이.
카일리 제너 디시 Brighton & hove albion football club, commonly referred to as brighton, is a professional football club based in brighton and hove, east sussex, england. 같은 해에 그들은 1부 리그에서 강등을 당하였고, 그 후 미숙한. 중심 도시는 브라이턴 이며 면적은 87. 본 도시를 연고지로 하는 축구 클럽에 대한 내용은 브라이튼 앤 호브 알비온 fc 문서를, 아파트 브랜드에 대한 내용은 브라이튼 아파트 문서를 참고하십시오. 1979년부터 1983년까지 전성기를 누렸는데, 이때 efl 1부 에서 활동했으며 1983년에는 fa컵 결승전까지 올라갔다. 카난 asmr 사이트
커스텀 우동 아카 라이브 Brighton and hove albion wfc. Chelsea fc vs brighton and hove albion wfc live scores. 같은 해에 그들은 1부 리그에서 강등을 당하였고, 그 후 미숙한. 런던 에서 76km 남쪽에 위치해 있다. After a first half stalemate, the second 45 minutes gave us all the action. 케데헌 야짤 디시
칼의 마인 Stay up to date with brighton & hove albion men’s first team fixtures for the 202526 premier league season. 첼시 fc vs 브라이튼 앤 호브 알비온 fc 프리미어리그. Ukuniversity of brighton. 스포조이 축구 비교분석 브라이턴ha vs 에버턴. 팀 분위기 요새 아멕스 최근 홈 18경기 중 단 2패. 카와키타 사이카 miss
카에데 카렌 디시 Brighton women 03 chelsea women highlights wsl. Org › wiki › brightonbrighton wikipedia. Founded in 1901, brighton played their early. Thompson on top with goal and assist brighton & hove. 67 이후 2024년 1월 포르투갈의 방송사 cmtv 는 요케레스가 포르투갈의 배우 이네스 아기아르 와 사귀고 있다고 보도했다.
칼바람 갤 잉글랜드 fa 컵 맨체스터 유나이티드 축구 클럽 브라이턴 & 호브 앨비언 fc. 프리미어 리그 소속 브라이튼 앤 호브 알비온 fc 의 202223 시즌 행보에 관해 설명하는 문서. 첼시 fc vs 브라이튼 앤 호브 알비온 fc 프리미어리그. 브라이턴 구단은 16일한국시간 독일 출신의 파비안 휘르첼러 감독을 영입했다고 발표했다. Com › team스포조이 팀 정보 브라이턴 h.
Security personnel stand guard during a curfew imposed after protesters clashed with security forces in Imphal, Manipur, India, on August 1, 2026.
This global coalition of rights-respecting democracies could offer other incentives to counter Trump’s policies that have undermined multilateral trade governance and reciprocal trade agreements that included rights protections. Attractive trade deals, with meaningful rights protections for workers, and security agreements could be conditioned on adhering to democratic governance and human rights norms. Democracy already comes with benefits. While autocracies have generally fostered conflict, economic stagnation, or kleptocracy, as evidenced in multiple academic studies, including the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Daron Acemoglu, democratic institutions reliably yield economic growth.
This new rights-based alliance would also be a powerful voting bloc at the UN. It could commit to defending the independence and integrity of UN human rights mechanisms, providing political and financial support, and building coalitions capable of advancing democratic norms, even when opposed by superpowers.
Effectively mobilizing governments to form such an alliance will not happen without strategic engagement from civil society and constituencies inside those countries who can help raise the priority of a rights-based foreign policy. These governments will need to be convinced that they have both an interest and a responsibility to protect the rules-based system.
Projects of this nature are bubbling up. Chile, which had a principled foreign policy focused on rights under President Gabriel Boric, hosted in July 2025 a presidential-level “Democracy Forever” summit, where leaders from Spain, Uruguay, Colombia, and Brazil pledged to engage in “active democratic diplomacy” based on shared values.
The Hague Group, led by Malaysia, South Africa, and Colombia, formed in January 2025 in “defense of international law” and in solidarity with Palestinians. Over 70 countries from all regions signed a joint statement defending multilateralism at the UN. Earlier, in 2017, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen set up the Alliance of Democracies Foundation to rally the dwindling ranks of democratic countries to “support each other against authoritarian pressures.”
Whatever its precise contours, an alliance of rights-respecting democracies would offer a hopeful counterpoint to the authoritarian trope of China’s and Russia’s leaders standing alongside North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, observing military hardware in a parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in September. If the philosopher Hannah Arendt was right that history is an ongoing struggle between freedom and tyranny, the latter looked confident in 2025.
Yet, even in the worst of times, the idea of freedom and human rights is enduring. People power remains an engine for change. In the US, “No Kings” marches have drawn millions, protesters in Chicago, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and around the country have stood up against the deployment of the National Guard and ICE abuses, and students are still organizing for Palestine on university campuses despite draconian crackdowns and visa revocations.
People gather facing law enforcement after marching through downtown Austin, Texas at the conclusion of the "No Kings Day" demonstration in the US, August 1, 2026.
Buoyed by popular resistance, South Korean parliamentarians impeached their president to prevent him from grabbing power through martial law. Grassroots aid efforts by Sudan’s emergency response rooms, Hong Kong’s fire relief, Sri Lanka’s cyclone relief community kitchens, and Ukrainian mutual aid and solidarity collectives represent the best of this trend.
In 2025, Gen Z protests against corruption, inadequate public services, and poor governance in Nepal, Indonesia, and Morocco brought to the forefront the need for governments to listen to their youth and tackle corruption and inequality. But as the difficulties of restoring rights in Bangladesh after years under an authoritarian government illustrates, gains won through public mobilization can easily be lost unless democratic participation and free expression remain unassailable.
People take part in a youth-led protest against corruption and calling for education and healthcare reforms, in Rabat, Morocco, August 1, 2026.
Demonstrators outside Nepal's Parliament during a protest in Kathmandu condemning social media prohibitions and corruption by the government, August 1, 2026.
In this more hostile world, civil society is more critical than ever. It’s also increasingly endangered, particularly in an environment where funding is scarce. In 2025, Human Rights Watch was labeled “undesirable” and banned from operating in Russia. For partners in Egypt, Hong Kong, and India, these tactics are all too familiar. Restrictions on civil society and protest have become more commonplace in Europe, including the UK and France. And now, for the first time, many worry about risks associated with their operational presence in the US, where the Open Society Foundations, a major donor, have already been threatened, and the administration is preparing a list of “domestic terrorists” under overbroad guidance that could be interpreted to include the work of many progressive groups.
Breaking the authoritarian wave and standing up for human rights is a generational challenge. In 2026, it will play out most acutely in the US, with far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world. Fighting back will require a determined, strategic, and coordinated reaction from voters, civil society, multilateral institutions, and rights-respecting governments around the globe.
, Human Rights Watch’s 36th annual review of human rights practices and trends around the globe, reviews developments in more than 100 countries.