Will Human Rights Survive a Trumpian World?

Authoritarian Advances Threaten Rules-Based Order

The global human rights system is in peril. Under relentless pressure from US President Donald Trump, and persistently undermined by China and Russia, the rules-based international order is being crushed, threatening to take with it the architecture human rights defenders have come to rely on to advance norms and protect freedoms. To defy this trend, governments that still value human rights, alongside social movements, civil society, and international institutions, need to form a strategic alliance to push back.

To be fair, the downward spiral predated Trump’s reelection. The democratic wave that began over 50 years ago has given way to what scholars term a “democratic recession.” Democracy is now back to 1985 levels according to some metrics, with 72 percent of the world’s population now living under autocracy. Russia and China are less free today than 20 years ago. And so is the United States.

Of course, democracy is not a panacea for human rights violations; the US and other longtime democracies have their own histories of colonial crimes, racism, abusive justice systems, and wartime atrocities. More recently, authoritarian leaders have exploited public mistrust and anger to win elections and then dismantled the very institutions that brought them to power. Democratic institutions are crucial to represent the will of the people and keep power in check. It’s no surprise that whenever democracy is undermined, rights are too, as evident in recent years in India, Türkiye, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Hungary.

In this context, 2025 may be seen as a tipping point. In just 12 months, the Trump administration has carried out a broad assault on key pillars of US democracy and the global rules-based order, which the US, despite inconsistencies, was, with other states, instrumental in helping to establish.

In short order, Trump’s second-term administration has undermined trust in the sanctity of elections, reduced government accountability, gutted food assistance and healthcare subsidies, attacked judicial independence, defied court orders, rolled back women’s rights, obstructed access to abortion care, undermined remedies for racial harm, terminated programs mandating accessibility for people with disabilities, punished free speech, stripped protections from trans and intersex people, eroded privacy, and used government power to intimidate political opponents, the media, law firms, universities, civil society, and even comedians.

Claiming a risk of “civilizational erasure” in Europe and leaning on racist tropes to cast entire populations as unwelcome in the US, the Trump administration has embraced policies and rhetoric that align with white nationalist ideology. Immigrants and asylum seekers have been subjected to inhumane conditions and degrading treatment; 32 died in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody in 2025, and as of mid-January 2026, an additional 4 have died. Masked immigration enforcement agents have targeted people of color, using excessive force, terrorizing communities, wrongfully arresting scores of citizens, and, most recently, unjustifiably killing two people in Minneapolis, whose deaths Human Rights Watch has documented.

The US president of course has the authority to tighten US borders and enforce stricter immigration policies. The administration is not, however, entitled to deny legal process to asylum seekers, mistreat undocumented migrants, or unlawfully discriminate. In a well-functioning democracy, no electoral mandate should supersede domestic legislation, constitutional protections, or international human rights law. Trump’s team has repeatedly bypassed these guardrails.

The violations have not stopped at the border. The Trump administration used a 1798 law to send hundreds of Venezuelan migrants to an infamous prison in El Salvador, where they were tortured and sexually abused. Its blatantly unlawful strikes on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific extrajudicially killed more than 120 people whom Trump claims were drug traffickers.

After the US attacked Venezuela and apprehended its president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump claimed the US would “run” the country and control its vast oil reserves. Despite paying lip service to human rights concerns under Maduro at the United Nations, Trump has worked with the same repressive apparatus to further US interests. Many Western allies have chosen to stay silent about these lawless moves, perhaps fearing erratic tariffs and blowback to their alliances.

Trump’s foreign policy has upended the foundations of the rules-based order that seeks to advance democracy and human rights, even if imperfectly.

Trump has boasted that he doesn’t “need international law” as a constraint, only his “own morality.” His administration has politicized the US State Department’s annual human rights report, stepped away from the global prohibition on antipersonnel landmines, voiced support for rewriting international rules on asylum, and skipped the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of the US’ human rights record.

His administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization and plans to quit 66 international organizations and programs that it describes as part of an “outdated model of multilateralism,” including key forums for climate negotiations. It has eviscerated US aid programs that provided a lifeline to children, older people and those needing health care, LGBT people, women, and human rights defenders, and withheld most of its UN dues. 

Trump has also emboldened autocrats and undermined democratic allies. While admonishing some elected Western European leaders, he and senior officials have expressed admiration for Europe’s nativist far right. He has favored autocrats such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, while continuing decades of US support to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

His administration has unjustifiably imposed sanctions to punish respected Palestinian human rights organizations, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor and many of its judges, a UN special rapporteur, and for several months, a Brazilian Supreme Court judge and his wife.

The institutional response in the US to Trump’s power grabs has been shockingly muted. Much of Congress, controlled by his own party, has not challenged his supercharged expansion of executive power. The leaders of the US’ most powerful technology companies have made significant donations and sought to placate the president. Some big law firms and prestigious universities have made deals rather than assert their independence, and some media organizations seem afraid to attract the president’s ire.

Has the US switched sides on the human rights playing field? While US engagement with human rights institutions has always been selective, China and Russia have long pursued an illiberal agenda. They stand much to gain from a US government that now expresses open hostility to universal rights. China and Russia remain strategic rivals of the US, but all three countries are now led by leaders who share open disdain for norms and institutions that could constrain their power.

Together, they wield considerable economic, military, and diplomatic power. If they were to consistently act as allies of convenience to erode global rules, they could threaten the entire system. Already, a loose international network of countries such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar, Cuba, and Belarus work in concert with Russia and China. These leaders share very little ideologically but align in undermining human rights and promoting a regressive international agenda. In word and in practice, the US government is now helping them in this endeavor.

The US’ weakening of multilateral institutions also dealt a serious blow to global efforts to prevent or stop grave international crimes. The “never again” movement, born from the horrors of the Holocaust and reignited by the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, spurred the UN General Assembly to embrace the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. Meant to guide international intervention to prevent and stop atrocities in tandem with efforts to prosecute and punish serious crimes, R2P made a real difference in places like the Central African Republic and Kenya.

Today, R2P is rarely invoked and the ICC is under siege. In addition to Trump’s far-reaching sanctions, in December 2025 a Moscow court sentenced the ICC prosecutor and eight of its judges to prison terms in absentia. Moreover, despite being ICC fugitives, in 2025, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was welcomed by Donald Trump in Alaska, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Hungary, an ICC member state at the time, at Orban’s invitation.

Twenty years ago, the US government and civil society were instrumental in galvanizing a response to mass atrocities in Darfur. Sudan is burning again, but this time under Trump, with relative impunity. Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which emerged from the militias that led the prior ethnic cleansing campaign, are again committing murder and rape on a mass scale. A growing body of evidence indicates that the UAE, a longtime US ally that recently made multi-billion-dollar deals with Trump, is providing the RSF with military support.

In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israeli armed forces have committed acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, killing over 70,000 people since the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and displacing the vast majority of Gaza’s population. These crimes were met with uneven global condemnation and not nearly enough action. Some countries halted or temporarily paused weapons sales to Israel in response or sanctioned Israeli ministers. Trump, however, continued a long-standing US policy of almost unconditional support to Israel, even as the International Court of Justice is weighing allegations of genocide and has issued binding orders under the Genocide Convention to protect Palestinians’ rights.

Trump announced in February an alarming US plan to transform Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East” free of Palestinians, which would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing. As implementation of the 20-point Trump peace plan has stalled, the administration has further normalized the dispossession of Palestinians through its failure to publicly protest Israel’s regular killing of those approaching the “yellow line” that now divides Gaza, its ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes, and unlawful restrictions on humanitarian aid.

In Ukraine, Trump’s peace efforts have consistently downplayed Russia’s responsibility for serious violations. These include indiscriminate bombing, coercing Ukrainians in occupied areas to serve in the Russian military, systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war, the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the use of quadcopter drones to hunt and kill civilians. Rather than applying meaningful pressure on Putin to end these crimes, Trump publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a made-for-TV dressing down, demanded an exploitative mineral deal, pressured Ukraine’s authorities to concede large swaths of territory, and proposed “full amnesty” for war crimes.

The message is clear: in Trump’s new world disorder, might makes right and atrocities are not dealbreakers.

总之，+86是中国的国际电话区号，后面紧跟的11位数字是手机号码。 在填写或输入时，需要注意不要遗漏或错误输入任何一位数字，以确保通信的顺畅和准确。 在国外的朋友给国内亲友打电话或者在国内需要使用国际电话功能时，都应遵循这一正确的格式。. 为了避开11开头如110、119和12开头如120、122造成冲突，手机选择了13开头。 139给了中国移动，130给了中国联通。 以前9003374的中国移动号码，就变成了 read more. Cn › page9中国国家区号86及手机号正确写法 jjqyw. 为了避开11开头如110、119和12开头如120、122造成冲突，手机选择了13开头。 139给了中国移动，130给了中国联通。 以前9003374的中国移动号码，就变成了 read more.

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86是国际电信联盟（itu）分配给中华人民共和国的国家电话区号，用于国际通信时标识中国电话号码。 该代码支持三种格式：+86（国际标准写法）、0086（国际冠码写法）和86（简化写法）。, 对于中国大陆的手机号码，其国际拨打格式为：+86（或0086）加上手机号码的11位数字。 这里的+86是中国的国际区号，用于标识拨打的是中国的电话号码。 而00是国际字冠，在某些国家和地区用于拨打国际长途电话。, Com › zhcn › blog中国电话号码格式：2025年终极指南. 除去运营商的标识位，剩下的数字提供了更多信息，包括年份。 中国的手机号码号段由国家电信监管机构管理，每个号段都与特定的时间范围相关。这些时间, 总之，+86是中国的国际电话区号，后面紧跟的11位数字是手机号码。 在填写或输入时，需要注意不要遗漏或错误输入任何一位数字，以确保通信的顺畅和准确。 在国外的朋友给国内亲友打电话或者在国内需要使用国际电话功能时，都应遵循这一正确的格式。. 中国的移动电话号码分为三大运营商：中国移动、 中国联通 和 中国电信。 每个运营商都有一定的号码段，可以通过前几位号码来区分不同的运营商和不同的地区。 例如： 中国移动：139、138、137、136、135、134、147、150、151、152、157、158、159、182、183、187、188、198.

86是国际电信联盟（itu）分配给中华人民共和国的国家电话区号，用于国际通信时标识中国电话号码。 该代码支持三种格式：+86（国际标准写法）、0086（国际冠码写法）和86（简化写法）。. 新系統確定使用以1開頭的特種號碼，讓出以9開頭的固話。 為了避開11開頭如110、119和12開頭如120、122造成衝突，手機選擇了13開頭。 139給了中國移 read more. +符号是国际电话拨号的标识，用来表示你正在拨打的是国际电话，而区号86则代表中国。 因此，当你从国外拨打中国的电话号码时，必须在号码前加上+86来指明你正在拨打的是中国的号码。 如果你是在中国境内拨打电话，则不需要加区号。 3. 3至20位，一般为10或11位（不含冠码） 固定电话： 0axcxxxxxxx 0bxxcxxxxxxx 0bxxcxxxxxx 移动电话：1bxxxxxxxxx a为12、b为39、c为28、x为, 这份全面的2025年指南将揭开中国电话号码结构的神秘面纱。 电话号码，使您能够自信而准确地进行连接。 国际拨号的复杂性、不同的号码长度以及地区差异可能令人望而生畏。 然而，只要掌握正确的知识和工具，驾驭中国电信行业就变得轻而易举。.

方法步骤 所以，一般我们读写手机号码是这样的格式：1xxxxxx xxxx。 手机号码读法 手机号码写法. 中国移动早期推出的1380、1390四字开头的手机号，如今已经成为了手机号中的老古董，目前的价值也是相当可观，并且还被冠以老板号，究竟怎么回事？ 国内的, 中国大陆电话号码 维基百科，自由的百科全书, 完整国际格式的电话号码包括加号+，然后是国家地区代码、城市代码和本地电话号码。在与whatsapp 联系时，请始终发送完整国际格式的电话号码。.

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在分配号段时，10开头的为电信行业服务号码，比如10000电信服务中心，10010联通服务中心， 10086移动服务中心；11开头的为特种服务号码，如110、119等；12开头的.. Com › question › 1251351317235476339中国号码+86正确 格式 百度知道.. 中国内地手机号码以1开头（未来预留92和98开头），共11位数，前7位数字通常称为手机号段。 手机号段类似于地区电话区号，但又不完全相同。 2010年11月之前，一 read more.. 对于中国大陆的手机号码，其国际拨打格式为：+86（或0086）加上手机号码的11位数字。 这里的+86是中国的国际区号，用于标识拨打的是中国的电话号码。 而00是国际字冠，在某些国家和地区用于拨打国际长途电话。..

Cn › page9中国国家区号86及手机号正确写法 jjqyw. 编辑 中国大陆手机号码以1开头（未来预留92、98开头），共11位数，前7位数字通常称为手机号段，可用于区分运营商和归属地，其作用类似于固定电话区号，但并不能相互. 新系統確定使用以1開頭的特種號碼，讓出以9開頭的固話。 為了避開11開頭如110、119和12開頭如120、122造成衝突，手機選擇了13開頭。 139給了中國移 read more, 我国的手机号为什么是11位呢？ 科技 新浪. 号码规则 手机号码 中国大陸 手机号码以1开头（未来预留92、98开头），共11位数，前7位数字通常称为手机号段，可用于区分运营商和归属地，其作用类似于固定电话区号，但并不能相互对应。 示例：1xxyyyyzzzz 第13位数表示电信运营商（1xx）；.

ahoo_08 インスタライブ 見方 对于中国大陆的手机号码，其国际拨打格式为：+86（或0086）加上手机号码的11位数字。 这里的+86是中国的国际区号，用于标识拨打的是中国的电话号码。 而00是国际字冠，在某些国家和地区用于拨打国际长途电话。. 在分配号段时，10开头的为电信行业服务号码，比如10000电信服务中心，10010联通服务中心， 10086移动服务中心；11开头的为特种服务号码，如110、119等；12开头的. 中国内地手机号码以1开头（未来预留92和98开头），共11位数，前7位数字通常称为手机号段。 手机号段类似于地区电话区号，但又不完全相同。 2010年11月之前，一 read more. 中国内地手机号码以1开头（未来预留92和98开头），共11位数，前7位数字通常称为手机号段。 手机号段类似于地区电话区号，但又不完全相同。 2010年11月之前，一 read more. 新系統確定使用以1開頭的特種號碼，讓出以9開頭的固話。 為了避開11開頭如110、119和12開頭如120、122造成衝突，手機選擇了13開頭。 139給了中國移 read more. 65g 녀

99 나이트 인더 포레스트 디시 中国手机号码开头前缀几位数？ +代表国际字冠，就像手机拨打国际长途拨+或00一样，86代表中国，从国外打回国内时必须先拨+86或0086，在中国一般可以省略。. 中国大陆电话号码 维基百科，自由的百科全书. 中国大陆电话号码 维基百科，自由的百科全书. 中国手机号码开头前缀几位数？ +代表国际字冠，就像手机拨打国际长途拨+或00一样，86代表中国，从国外打回国内时必须先拨+86或0086，在中国一般可以省略。. 3至20位，一般为10或11位（不含冠码） 固定电话： 0axcxxxxxxx 0bxxcxxxxxxx 0bxxcxxxxxx 移动电话：1bxxxxxxxxx a为12、b为39、c为28、x为. 4p pikpak

9살 차이 연애 디시 我国的手机号为什么是11位呢？ 科技 新浪. 3至20位，一般为10或11位（不含冠码） 固定电话： 0axcxxxxxxx 0bxxcxxxxxxx 0bxxcxxxxxx 移动电话：1bxxxxxxxxx a为12、b为39、c为28、x为. 编辑 中国大陆手机号码以1开头（未来预留92、98开头），共11位数，前7位数字通常称为手机号段，可用于区分运营商和归属地，其作用类似于固定电话区号，但并不能相互. 完整国际格式的电话号码包括加号+，然后是国家地区代码、城市代码和本地电话号码。在与whatsapp 联系时，请始终发送完整国际格式的电话号码。. +符号是国际电话拨号的标识，用来表示你正在拨打的是国际电话，而区号86则代表中国。 因此，当你从国外拨打中国的电话号码时，必须在号码前加上+86来指明你正在拨打的是中国的号码。 如果你是在中国境内拨打电话，则不需要加区号。 3. @faiiryquadmother reddit

700리라 Com › zhcn › blog中国电话号码格式：2025年终极指南. 中国手机号码开头前缀几位数？ +代表国际字冠，就像手机拨打国际长途拨+或00一样，86代表中国，从国外打回国内时必须先拨+86或0086，在中国一般可以省略。. 这份全面的2025年指南将揭开中国电话号码结构的神秘面纱。 电话号码，使您能够自信而准确地进行连接。 国际拨号的复杂性、不同的号码长度以及地区差异可能令人望而生畏。 然而，只要掌握正确的知识和工具，驾驭中国电信行业就变得轻而易举。. 对于中国大陆的手机号码，其国际拨打格式为：+86（或0086）加上手机号码的11位数字。 这里的+86是中国的国际区号，用于标识拨打的是中国的电话号码。 而00是国际字冠，在某些国家和地区用于拨打国际长途电话。. 方法步骤 所以，一般我们读写手机号码是这样的格式：1xxxxxx xxxx。 手机号码读法 手机号码写法.

ai photo2 kemono 方法步骤 所以，一般我们读写手机号码是这样的格式：1xxxxxx xxxx。 手机号码读法 手机号码写法. 在分配号段时，10开头的为电信行业服务号码，比如10000电信服务中心，10010联通服务中心， 10086移动服务中心；11开头的为特种服务号码，如110、119等；12开头的. 中国手机号码开头前缀几位数？ +代表国际字冠，就像手机拨打国际长途拨+或00一样，86代表中国，从国外打回国内时必须先拨+86或0086，在中国一般可以省略。. 中国的移动电话号码分为三大运营商：中国移动、 中国联通 和 中国电信。 每个运营商都有一定的号码段，可以通过前几位号码来区分不同的运营商和不同的地区。 例如： 中国移动：139、138、137、136、135、134、147、150、151、152、157、158、159、182、183、187、188、198. 方法步骤 所以，一般我们读写手机号码是这样的格式：1xxxxxx xxxx。 手机号码读法 手机号码写法.

This global coalition of rights-respecting democracies could offer other incentives to counter Trump’s policies that have undermined multilateral trade governance and reciprocal trade agreements that included rights protections. Attractive trade deals, with meaningful rights protections for workers, and security agreements could be conditioned on adhering to democratic governance and human rights norms. Democracy already comes with benefits. While autocracies have generally fostered conflict, economic stagnation, or kleptocracy, as evidenced in multiple academic studies, including the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist Daron Acemoglu, democratic institutions reliably yield economic growth. 

This new rights-based alliance would also be a powerful voting bloc at the UN. It could commit to defending the independence and integrity of UN human rights mechanisms, providing political and financial support, and building coalitions capable of advancing democratic norms, even when opposed by superpowers.

Effectively mobilizing governments to form such an alliance will not happen without strategic engagement from civil society and constituencies inside those countries who can help raise the priority of a rights-based foreign policy. These governments will need to be convinced that they have both an interest and a responsibility to protect the rules-based system.

Projects of this nature are bubbling up. Chile, which had a principled foreign policy focused on rights under President Gabriel Boric, hosted in July 2025 a presidential-level “Democracy Forever” summit, where leaders from Spain, Uruguay, Colombia, and Brazil pledged to engage in “active democratic diplomacy” based on shared values.

The Hague Group, led by Malaysia, South Africa, and Colombia, formed in January 2025 in “defense of international law” and in solidarity with Palestinians. Over 70 countries from all regions signed a joint statement defending multilateralism at the UN. Earlier, in 2017, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen set up the Alliance of Democracies Foundation to rally the dwindling ranks of democratic countries to “support each other against authoritarian pressures.”

Whatever its precise contours, an alliance of rights-respecting democracies would offer a hopeful counterpoint to the authoritarian trope of China’s and Russia’s leaders standing alongside North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, observing military hardware in a parade in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in September. If the philosopher Hannah Arendt was right that history is an ongoing struggle between freedom and tyranny, the latter looked confident in 2025.

Yet, even in the worst of times, the idea of freedom and human rights is enduring. People power remains an engine for change. In the US, “No Kings” marches have drawn millions, protesters in Chicago, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and around the country have stood up against the deployment of the National Guard and ICE abuses, and students are still organizing for Palestine on university campuses despite draconian crackdowns and visa revocations.

Buoyed by popular resistance, South Korean parliamentarians impeached their president to prevent him from grabbing power through martial law. Grassroots aid efforts by Sudan’s emergency response rooms, Hong Kong’s fire relief, Sri Lanka’s cyclone relief community kitchens, and Ukrainian mutual aid and solidarity collectives represent the best of this trend.

In 2025, Gen Z protests against corruption, inadequate public services, and poor governance in Nepal, Indonesia, and Morocco brought to the forefront the need for governments to listen to their youth and tackle corruption and inequality. But as the difficulties of restoring rights in Bangladesh after years under an authoritarian government illustrates, gains won through public mobilization can easily be lost unless democratic participation and free expression remain unassailable.